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Abstract 
The importance of the data authentication has resulted in the science of the data 
protection. Interest in this knowledge has been growing due to the increase in privacy of 
the user’s identity, especially after the widespread use of online transactions. Many 
security techniques are available to maintain the privacy of the user’s identity. These 
include password, smart card or token and face recognition or finger print. But 
unfortunately, the possibility to duplicate the identity of a user is still possible. 
Recently, specialists used the user’s physical location as a new factor in order to 
increase the strength of the verification of the user’s identity.  
This thesis focused on the authentication-based user’s location. It is based on the idea of 
using the Global Position System in order to verify the user identity. Improving 
Kerberos protocol using GPS signal is proposed in order to eliminate the effect of replay 
attack. This proposal does not expect a high performance from the user during the 
implementation of the security system. Moreover, to give users more confidence to use 
security protocol, it has to be evaluated before accepting it. Thus, a measurement tool 
used to validate protocols called BAN logic was described. In this thesis, a new form of 
BAN logic which aims to raise the efficiency checking process of the protocol 
protection strength using the GPS signal is proposed.  
The proposed form of Kerberos protocol has been analysed using the new form of BAN 
logic. The new scheme has been tested and compared with the existing techniques to 
demonstrate its merits and capabilities.  
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Information security has been crucial since medieval times. Users have been perturbed 
from this challenge. At all times, the interference by undesirable elements of personal 
information and property is a source of major concern. Recently, the world turned to use 
online in all walks of life, especially after the communications revolution. This rapid 
development in communications soon accelerated the work and increased efficiency and 
productivity, but unfortunately it also increased opportunities for hackers to practice 
their undesirable act. This placed a huge responsibility on researchers to develop 
security protocols in order to provide secure communication lines. Many security 
strategies using very powerful encryption codes, such as Rivest, Shamir and Adelman 
(RSA) [14, 67], Data Encryption Standard (DES) [18, 25] or Message Digest version 5 
(MD5) [109], have been proposed to eliminate the ability of hackers to interfere within 
the information and communication domain. One of these strategies called Kerberos 
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protocol [8, 57, 84, 121]; although, it is relatively secure online key exchange protocol, 
even then many international reports assert the growing incidents of hacking. This 
resulted in professionals to derive mechanisms to check the protocol before use. 
Therefore, Burrows, Abadi and Needham [10] produced a formal testing structure for 
security protocol called BAN logic. This logic won the admiration of many specialists, 
especially when it discovered flaws in many of the protocols that were thought by all to 
be robust. Despite some strategies of full certification by BAN logic, it also still 
remained under attack. 
This thesis illustrates the problems and presents new approach followed by Kerberos 
protocol. It uses the user’s physical location as a new factor in order to increase the 
strength of the verification of the user’s identity. In addition, it presents a new form of 
BAN logic which also aims to raise the efficiency checking process of the protocol 
protection strength. 
 
1.2 Research Scope 
This thesis includes four main areas; Authentication, Security protocols, Global Position 
System and BAN logic. Each of the main areas is discussed below: 
1.2.1 Authentication 
Authentication is a process which aims to check whether the user identity is genuine and 
bona fide or forgery. There are three main factors that have been used to authenticate 
the user identity. The first factor called “something you know” such as, user name and 
password. The second factor is called “something you have” such as, token or smart 
card. The third factor is “something you are” such as, finger print, iris or facial scan. 
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Recently, user’s address has been added as a new authentication factor. This address can 
be captured by using a sensor device.    
This thesis describes the authentication factors in detail and explores many strategies 
that apply to these factors. The advantages and disadvantages of each are presented in 
the literature review section. 
1.2.2    Security Protocol 
A security protocol is a set of steps that are made during the process of communication 
between two parties, so as to ensure that communication has taken place without there 
being breakthrough. In this thesis, Kerberos was chosen because of its fame and power, 
and is thus studied in detail. As Kerberos needs more research and development, a new 
form of Kerberos is suggested by adding the user’s physical location address using the 
facility of Global Position System (GPS).  
1.2.3    Global Position System (GPS) 
“Global Position System is a radio navigation system that allows land, sea, and airborne 
users to determine their exact location, velocity, and time 24 hours a day, in all weather 
conditions, anywhere in the world”1. GPS is accurate and robust. Therefore, it is 
proposed that by using the strength of GPS’s signal there is a strong likelihood to 
increase the authentication level of the user’s identity. 
1.2.4    BAN Logic 
BAN logic is a group of rules used to analyse the exchange messages between two 
parties. It helps to determine whether the message is secure against hackers or not. Full 
details about BAN logic are presented, and the need for its improvement. Then, a new 
                                                 
1
 GPS resources “http://www.gis2gps.com/GPS/gps.html”  
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measurement tool followed on BAN which is more robust and more effective than BAN 
logic.  
 
1.3    Motivations 
Although the world is using modern and sophisticated techniques to prevent hackers 
from penetrating the user’s identity, the world still suffers from many cases of intrusion 
and theft. This is what stimulated this study; but suffices to highlight the following 
problems: 
Motivation 1:  
Most users do not follow the correct instructions in the definition of the protocol before 
using it, which may cause a hack. The reason for this behaviour is due to several factors, 
such as: 
1. Indifference by users of the consequences of inaccurate definitions. 
2. Some users believe that they are beyond the scope of hackers. 
Motivation 2: 
Some of the definitions are changeable from case to case. This makes the accuracy of 
the identification extremely difficult. For example, in some cases, the user has to define 
the required time for every single service. This time varies depending on the type of 
service, size of the network and the amount of demand for the service. These factors 
make it difficult to accurately define. 
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Motivation 3:     
One of the main disadvantages of the security protocols is that they rely on the user's 
performance. Therefore, there is a direct relationship between the proficiently of the 
user and the strength of the security protocols. So, in case of the use of weak password, 
users are likely to be more easily prone to attack. Or, if the user has installed some of 
the wrong setting, the system will be vulnerable. 
Motivation 4: 
The measurement tools, which most of the people are using to check the protection 
quality of the security protocol, do not adequately take care of the performance of the 
user. It is a group of logical or mathematical operations that are taking place to make 
sure that the sending and receiving messages have been done in a correct way without 
paying attention to many important details, which may cause the message for a 
breakthrough, although the accuracy of these operations. For example, measurement 
tool request a password to encrypt the message, but it does not check the strength of this 
password. This may lead to give a positive result about the quality of the messages, 
where in fact, the message is vulnerable because of using a weak password. 
 
1.4 Aims and Objectives 
This study is concerned on the issue of the authentication. Further details are presented 
with the following points: 
1. One of the most important aims for this study is to develop a new protocol that 
can ensure adequate protection to the user, irrespective of the user not following 
instructions to protect them. This technique does not need administrative 
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solution and it should not depend on the education of the users on how to use the 
system to protect themselves. The aim is to protect them technically without 
getting them to carry out any task prior. 
2. This study is also aim to produce another layer of the protection in addition to 
the encryption level. This new layer characterize by a fixed definition that can be 
used to access different services. The importance of this goal is the elimination 
of much verification that have been used to implement security systems that 
often lead to errors being exploited by hackers to penetrate systems. 
3. To complete the process of ensuring that the user is protected, a new mechanism 
to examine the protection level of the Protocol must be developed in which it 
takes into account the inadequate performance of the user. In other words, the 
aim is to make sure that the user is protected in spite of the relatively poor 
showings in the definitions of the system. 
Raising the effective level of the existing encryption code, or building a new encryption 
systems will not necessarily solve the problem. This is because the reason of the 
existence of the problem is not weak in the existing encryption software. Searching for 
technology that is different from the predecessors is a must. This thesis has considered 
the following steps to achieve the aims mentioned above: 
1. Literature survey to explore the existing strategies, their strength and weakness.  
2. The possible use of the user's physical location address through the GPS signal 
is used in this thesis due complexity of calculating the physical address.  
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3. And then, to ensure the protection of the user, the GPS signal was considered as 
a prerequisite to accept the messages without involving the user in the drafting 
of this signal. 
4. It was necessary then, to add the user’s physical address as a key condition to the 
available measurement checking tools of the protocol quality in order to confirm 
that the message is secure.  
5. Finally, the ease of use the system has been confirmed by detail examination and 
comparing them with currently available systems. 
 
1.5    Contributions 
In this thesis, it is shown that the reason for the continued success of hackers, despite 
the presence of advanced security technologies due to poor performance of the user. 
Therefore, the user is going to be compelled in a technical context to protect themselves. 
This is achieved by the following:  
Contribution 1:  
A new form of security protocol is proposed followed on Kerberos protocol which is 
shortly called N-Kerberos. N-Kerberos has a new level of protection which relies on the 
user’s physical location captured by the military GPS signal (P(Y) code). The quality of 
added protection level is not based on the user’s performance. Moreover, the user is 
compelled to send his location’s signature, otherwise the message will not be accepted.  
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Contribution 2: 
The second contribution aims to verify whether the user is transmitting the messages 
using his official location or not. A new feature to BAN logic is incorporated, which 
said that the message must contain the right location signature, otherwise the message 
will not be accepted. 
Contribution 3: 
The third contribution aims to implement the new approach of Kerberos protocol and 
subject it using the form of BAN logic. 
1.6    Outline of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is set out as follows: 
Chapter 2 gives details of the authentication. It demonstrates the different 
authentication factors and Keys, how it works and shows its advantages and 
disadvantages. In addition, classify in details the using of user’s address in order to 
authenticate the user identity. Considerable challenges were encountered pertaining to 
data protection, especially when using sensors. It is suggested that authentication needs 
more investigation in order to be stronger and more effective.  
Chapter 3 explains the relevant security protocols and gives examples such as 
Needham Schroeder and Kerberos protocols [10]. The short coming of Kerberos 
protocol are highlighted and proposed a new form of Kerberos. This new form contains 
the physical location signature as a new authentication factor.  
Chapter 4 discusses a well known measurement tool called BAN logic. It is to check 
the quality of protection of the security protocols. It is shown that it needs to be 
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modified and a new measurement tool followed by BAN logic that is called N-BAN 
Logic is proposed. Finally, the proposed protocol in chapter three is scrutinised with the 
aid of N-BAN logic.  
Chapter 5 explains an implementation of the proposed security protocol (N-Kerberos). 
It gives details of where it can be applied.  
Chapter 6 gives a summary of the research work presented in this thesis and suggests 
future work.  
Chapter 2:  Literature  Review 
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Chapter 2: 
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The authentication of the users’ identity has caught the attention of many researchers; 
considering its great importance in the field of data security. Authentication presents a 
real challenge, especially with the surge in using of online transactions. The user's 
identity can be verified by many factors called authentication factors. These factors 
have different ways of implementation; the first factor is the password and/or the 
personal information. The second factor is by using devices such as token or smart card. 
The third factor is the reliance on features such as sound waves, iris, facial and 
fingerprint. After the wide use of the online transactions, developing more appropriate 
ways becomes necessary, as will be explained in details. 
This chapter is described into two parts; in the first part, the importance of using the 
authentication for user identity and the different aspects of authentication process are 
presented in details. The various strategies available to authenticate the user’s identity 
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using the authentication factors are presented and also the advantages and disadvantages 
of each of these strategies are discussed. Whereas in the second part of the chapter, 
location focused authentication is presented. This part explains why choosing the new 
factor is important, what are the challenges to demonstrate the efficiency of using it and 
then some studies on the use of this factor will be presented. 
The remainder of this chapter is set out as follows; the value of the authentication and 
the methods of attacks against the authentication exchange process are given in section 
2.2. Details of authentication factors are illustrated in section 2.3.  Section 2.4 presents 
the way of achieving much superior authentication. In section 2.5, the well-known 
authentication keys is introduce, argue their advantages and disadvantages.  Section 2.6 
shows the different methods used to identify the user’s physical location such as sensors 
and GPS receivers. Challenges faced by using sensors and full details of strategies used 
to overcome these challenges have been presented in the same section. This section also 
contains full detail of the GPS signal’s and the reasons it is considered superior in 
determining the user’s identity. The justification of the proposed research is presented in 
section 2.7. Finally, conclusion and future work are discussed in the last section. 
 
2.2 The Value of Authentication 
Authentication is an automated process of verifying the identity of entity, such as user, 
computer or application. It is information used to confirm the genuineness prior to 
accessing a service. This essential element of authentication becomes even more crucial 
with the surge in the use of the internet. The remarkable and significant growth on the 
use of on-line transactions has enabled internet identity thieves and computer hackers to 
carry out their undesirable acts. The reliable picture of online fraud has been shown on 
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the Internet Crime Complaint Center's (IC3)
2
 statistics as a baseline. IC3 reported that 
online banking fraud is increasing. In order to appreciate the importance of 
authentication, some selected methods for attacking authentication exchange process are 
listed below: 
 Eavesdropper attacks, where an attacker steals the message which are sent between 
two participants and attempts to modify it. Then, the attacker authenticates himself as 
a legitimate user [71].  
 Man-in-the-middle attack (MITM), which the attacker control the entire 
conversation between the victim and the server, making them believe that they are 
talking directly to each other over a private connection. The attacker intercepts all 
messages going between the two parties and replaces them to different ones. This type 
of attack called bucket-brigade attack, or sometimes Janus attack [112]. 
 Malicious code attacks, an attacker send an executable application to the user in 
order to control the victim's computer. One of the most dangerous malicious codes is 
Access Violations [123]; the attacker accesses the personal computer and steals a 
confidential data such as list of login names and passwords, credit card numbers and 
many other information. Denial of Service (DoS) [135] is also another example of 
malicious code attack; an attacker stops the user from using the system by deleting 
files that are open at the time of the attack. 
                                                 
2
 The IC3 began operation on May 8, 2000, as the Internet Fraud Complaint Center and was 
established as a partnership between the National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C) and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to serve as a vehicle to receive, develop, and refer 
criminal complaints regarding the rapidly expanding arena of cyber crime 
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 Password discovery attacks, an attacker aims to determine the password. There are 
many available applications in which to help attackers to ascertain the password 
relying on guessing the passwords or dictionary attacks [22]. 
 Phishing attacks, it is called a social engineering attacks. The attacker sends a 
counterfeit website, which is almost identical to the legitimate one, and asks the user 
to enter their details. This is to forge or compromise users' sensitive information [48, 
65].  
 Replay attacks, an attacker records the message sent from the legitimate user and 
replays it to the verifier to attempt to mislead the verifier [72]. 
These attacks highlight the need for a robust and enhanced authentication; it is of vital 
importance than ever in order to establish trust and confidence between two parties 
doing transactions over an open network. There are many factors that are available and 
used to verify the identity of the user. The next section shows these different factors of 
authentication. 
 
2.3 Authentication Factors 
The ways in which the users can verify their identity is called authentication factors. 
These methods or factors are then categorised into three groups; the first factor called 
"Something you know", the second factor is "Something you have" and "Something you 
are" is the third factor.  Using username and password or some personal information is a 
well-known example of "something you know". The user needs to remember and insert 
group of string and characters to verify him/her self before accessing the resources [112, 
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117, 119]. The second factor is based on what the user has to verify him/herself such as 
token, smart card, secure ID card, USB keys, etc. The hackers will not be able to access 
the resources unless he/she has a device. It is relatively difficult to be hacked than using 
a password. Note that such objects have a complicated cryptographic key see chapter 9 
in  [112]. "Something you are" is based on unique human physical characteristics. This 
method of authentication is called biometrics. It can be used to differentiate between 
persons. Some organisations use this factor in such systems as Fingerprint and Iris 
recognition [50-52, 95]. Table 2.1 shows the three authentication factors. O’Gorman 
provides more details regarding authentication factors made comparisons on their 
features [92]. 
Table 2.1: Examples of authentication factors 
Factor name Examples 
Something you know Password, personal information 
Something you have Smart card, token 
Something you are Fingerprint, eyes scan 
Nowadays, many systems use multi-factor authentication in conjunction in order to 
increase the authenticity quality. It has been noted that using many factors as opposed to 
one factor give a superior level of authentication assurance, which will be discussed in 
the next section. 
 
2.4 Strong Authentication 
Strong authentication is defined as the use of more than one factor of authentication in 
order to achieve secured communication channel. Systems can use particular form of 
authentication which use two or three independent factors of user identity being utilised 
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together to have a strong authentication than the use of single factor [92]. Multi factors 
authentication can deliver higher level of authentication assurance because the amount 
of work for an attacker generally increases with using more than one factor; the attacker 
therefore needs to find out only the password in case of using one factor. While they 
need to find out the password and steal or copy the smart card when using two 
authentication factors [92]. Each authentication factor represents independent protection 
level. Protection systems that use two authentication factors such as token and password 
or biometrics, provide two protection levels. Therefore, the user needs to pass two levels 
to access the data. Therefore, by stealing the token alone, it does not allow them to 
reach the data. Furthermore, by using three authentication factors, token, password and 
biometrics need to be used to access the data. Figure 2.1 shows the multi factors 
authentication. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Multi factors authentication 
Details of available keys to authenticate user’s identity, how it works and advantages 
and disadvantages are presented in the next section. 
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2.5 Authentication Keys 
There are many keys, which can be used to ensure that data exchanged from one 
participant to another remains unchanged by any unauthorized third party. These keys 
called authentication keys and also called electronic or digital keys. It is relying, entirely 
on electronic encryption codes based on unique information.  Applying more than one 
authentication key would thus create additional layer of security [92]. The following are 
the details of the well known authentication keys: 
1. Passwords 
2. Hardware tokens 
3. One-Time Passwords 
4. Biometrics. 
5. Knowledge-base  
6. Out-of-Band 
There are however other available models and brands. The details and the way of using 
each of the authentication keys are considered together with the advantages and 
disadvantages of each.  
2.5.1 Password 
It is a secret string of characters used to provide or gain access to information on a 
network.  It is a discrete word and supposed to be shared between the user and the 
server or the verifier. Using password is going to be a good method to authenticate the 
user identity if the user uses a combination of letters and numbers as it reduces the 
chances of piercing the password [118]. For example, the number of possible password 
can be calculated by: 
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(N
F
)     
N  …   Total number of characters 
F  …   Password length 
Table 2.2 shows the needed time to crack the different length of password by using 
100.000 encryption operations per second. The first column shows the password length, 
second column is for the crack time and the number at the top total number of character 
[6].  
Table 2.2:  Time needed for password crack [6] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is shown that more than 20 years is needed to crack the password of 7 digits. A hacker 
will therefore need an entire life time to crack a 12 digit password.  
On the other hand, there are many precautions that must be taken into account when 
using the password. Most of the problems of using the password are as a result of the 
user choosing or using inappropriate password combination. The following are 
considered to be some of the draw backs:  
1. It may not be easy for the users to memorize the password all the time. It is 
overhead management particularly for individuals with memory loss [30].  
94 
Seconds 8.3 3 
Minutes 13.0 4 
Hours 20.4 5 
Months 2.63 6 
Years 20.6 7 
Millennia 1.93 8 
Millennia 9.86 9 
Millennia 670 10 
Millennia 45,582 11 
Millennia 3,099,562 12 
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2. Users may write the passwords down in place that is accessible to others, or using 
the same password for long periods or, usually, choosing an easy to guess 
passwords. All of these will increase the capability to steal the password [9, 100].  
3. Most users are not following a good instruction to choose a good password [63]. 
This may lead to easy penetration.   
4. Most users write user name and password down or save then in a word file in the 
PC. This will invariably encourages poor security practices[30].  
5. In online transactions, using password, as a unique authentication factor without 
using a fixed life for the message, will give the attacker a good chance to have a 
long time to steal the signal and attempt to decrypt it and reuse it as a legitimate 
user.   
6. There are many types of attacks that could occur concerning password. The 
following are some of them: 
a. Man-in-the-middle attack, attacker will be able to catch the signal sent 
from one participant to another [112]. 
b. Insider attack, system manager who has access to the password file can 
carry out these passwords [113]. 
c. Phishing attacks, attacker can steal the password by sending a fake or 
dummy website, as described in section 2.1 [59, 120]. 
A survey of the password mechanism is proposed in [54]. Hardware token has been 
proposed instead of password in order to overcome the drawbacks mentioned above. 
Details of hardware token is presenting in the next section.     
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2.5.2 Hardware Token 
Hardware tokens are special devices that can encrypt the identity information, such as 
password, before sending them to the verifier. This is a combination between password 
and device. In the likely event that the token is lost or stolen; it will be redundant and 
unable to be used. It is an implementation of using password “something you know” 
and token or smartcard “something you have” in the same time [33]. Using both 
password and token instead of using password to authenticate the user identity might 
decrease the ability of hackers.  In addition, the user can easily notice if taken is stolen 
or not in their possession as it is a physical object. In an attempt to overcome the issue 
surrounding remembering passwords; systems are now relying on unique personal 
information such as biometrics to authenticate the smart card [19, 90, 110, 137].  
There are, on the other hand, some drawbacks in using smart card or token. These are 
listed below: 
1. The user has to carry an additional smart card or USB. This will irritate many 
users  
2. Smart card can be stolen  and all the data can be cracked by using power and time 
attack [97]. 
3. Clients or customers can not authenticate his/her identity if his/her token is lost. 
They will be out of the service until it is replaced.  
4. User may not be relied upon to keep their private key secret [128]. 
5. Managers have to do many complex and critical tasks, such as keep issuing a 
different set of keys periodically and download software into the computer in 
order to use the hardware device. In addition, they have to manage the token and 
the cryptographic keys.  
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2.5.3 One Time Password 
One time password (OTP) is an implementation of disposable password [7] as it can 
only be used once. There are two main controls for OTP to be high secure strategy; 
password’s length and number of iteration time for hashing the password. Figure 2.2 
shows the structure of generating the hashed OTP [118]. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Generating Hashed OTP 
The user asks the proxy server to login by sending the user-ID in step 1. In step 2, the 
proxy server checks the validity of the user-ID. If acceptable, the proxy server will send 
to the user a challenge message which includes the seed and sequence number (N), 
which is the iteration number of hashing. OTP will be generated by hashing the seed 
number with the stored password N times and save them in the server. In the next step, 
the user will pass the seed number and his/her password to the proxy server after 
hashing it N time. The Proxy server, in the forth step, will compare the received OTP 
with the one which is stored in the server to check the user validity. Finally, the value of 
N will be changed, so, the hacker would not be able to generate the next password. 
For example, a user uses a list of password printed on a sheet or send it by a secured e-
mail channel. Every user has a different password list and each password has a serial 
number, as shown in table 2.3. The user should insert the user name and requested 
password from the table, and this password would not be used again.  
Proxy server  User Step 
 Request 1 
Send Code  2 
 Generate OTP 3 
Respond  4 
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Table 2.3:  List of password 
 
 
 
For example, suppose you are debiting £1000 by ATM bank machine. The bank will ask 
you to insert on the password from the list you have. Figure 2.3 explain this example. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3:  Confirmation letter 
Figure 2.4 shows another example of using OTP. A USB Token that generates One 
Time Password (OTPs) [128]. The token connects to the USB port. It can then transmit 
and receive an encrypted data.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.4:  One Time Password token 
OTP is more robust because of using different password for every different time. 
However, it has some disadvantages, as follows:  
1. Using shared table of password is not secure because it has the same problems as 
written-down passwords. This table could be lost, stolen or copied and then being 
used by another user as a legitimate and autherised user.  
Password ID 
H G F A R U I 5 0001 
T H U A Z P 5 B 0002 
6 F S 4 J 9 C M 0003 
W G T E C V B 7 0060 
R T H I O 3 4 C 0064 
 
Confirmation Letter 
You are attempting to debit £1000 
from your account. 
Please confirm by entering the 
password password number 0064:---
------------------ 
You will not be asked to enter this 
code later. 
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2. One-time password needs more management time and also more cost. Managers 
will need to issue the list of password and monitor the using of these password list 
to update when the current password are used. In addition, special software has to 
be installed in the verifier's computer. 
3. Users may share list of password with others. 
4. In some cases, the token itself may be vulnerable to the replay attack [132]. 
5. The token may not be protected against phishing attack [93] . Details of phishing 
attack will be provided in chapter six. 
User’s biometrics verification is another type of password. It is not easy to be pretended 
as will be illustrated in the next section. 
 2.5.4 Biometrics Verification 
Biometrics is a unique human physiology characteristics being measured to authenticate 
the user identity. Usually, Biometrics refers to the technology of using the human body 
characteristics. It is divided into two main sets as follows: 
 Physiological, which is related to the human body characteristics such as 
fingerprints, hand geometry and retina. 
 Behavioral, which is related to the person's behavior such as hand written 
signature, gait, and voice waves.  
To prove that the user is who he says that he is, the system needs to check its database 
of previously taken or registered samples to see if the live sample matches the reference 
sample. Its security is dependent on the hard to copy or forge the sample. Biometrics 
features is not possible to be forged. Moreover, users can not borrow or lend his 
biometrics. In addition, most of the biometric data is stable for a long time. Therefore, 
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user does not need to memorize different password. For more information about how 
biometrics authentication works, refer to reference [77]. This method of authentication 
has its own unique disadvantages, some of which are presented below: 
 
1. The Biometric feature is easy to attack by replicating it because it is based on not 
secrecy number [17, 104]. In addition, this replication is relatively not costly.  
2. Biometrics is not identical every time. The possibility of false match for 
identification is greater than that for verification [31, 51, 94, 131].  
3. Attacks against the biometrics features are very dangerous by contrast with any 
other authentication key, because a person's biometrics is unchangeable data and 
losing any part of his biometrics may cause a break of his identity privacy. 
4. In some cases, biometrics is for public use. The Biometrics Institute in Australia 
has a draft Privacy Code [80] that is currently being reviewed by the (Australian) 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner prior to final publication. The draft has 
already been issued for public comment. The Department of Internal Affairs is 
developing a similar document for New Zealand government agencies. This 
document is intended for release by late 2006. 
5. The biometric is a number that does not differ from the other key; the difficulty is 
the ability to counterfeit the original document, but the secrecy of the number does 
not make it a highly secured [17]. 
2.5.5 Knowledge Based 
This is a well-known medium in identity authentication. It challenges the user to 
provide some special information, where the attacker does not know this information. It 
is unlikely for the attackers to know this particular information about the user. The user 
confirms this information at the beginning of the registration process for the server to be 
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Authentication Center 
 
Answering these couple of questions are 
requested to ensure your identity before 
accessing the resources: 
------------------  : Date of Birth 
------------------ : Your Favourite Color 
------------------What is your last amount 
used in challenging the user. The users are usually presented with easy information to 
keep in mind such as favorite colour, favourite name, mother maiden name, etc to 
answer the questions when receiving the challenges from the server. Figure 2.5 
illustrates an example of server’s challenge questions[49]. If the user’s answers are 
matched with the information stored when registered, then server will accept the user to 
use the resources or services. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Challenge Questions 
To have a stronger methodology of asking, questions should not be fixed. The data 
should be changeable such as the data based on the history of previous “access 
signature”. This is accomplished by collections of information about the user’s website 
accessing such as IP address, browser settings and geographic location without the need 
of collecting the user’s personal information. Another type of question is relying on the 
previous use of the resource or service. Figure 2.6 illustrates an example of intelligent 
questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6:  Intelligent Challenge Questions 
Authentication Center 
Answering these couple of questions are 
requested to ensure your identity before 
accessing the resources: 
------------------  : Date of Birth 
------------------: Your Favourite Color 
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This method of authentication is not being as it was before, however listed below are the 
disadvantages. 
1. The server challenges the user by fixed number of questions. The answers of these 
questions can be known if hackers follow the user many times. For example, 
server might ask the user about his/her favourite colour, best day, date of birth or 
post code. This group of questions can be collected by hackers and use it later for 
replaying the server. 
2.  It is considered that although, intelligent questions are used to reduce the ability 
of hackers, the user may not prefer to use it because it is not easy to perform; the 
user needs to memorize a lot of information such as his/her bank account and/or 
last time using the resources and so on.  
3. It is an overhead management. Managers have to manage all questions and 
answers every time.  
4. It is an open time for attacker trying to discover this type of information because it 
is fixed information.  
2.5.6 Out-of-Band Authentication 
This way of authentication depends on communication with the users, by using channels 
registered with organisations, during the transactions. This challenge called on-line 
communication. It prevents threats to access the information. This is through immediate 
confirmation from the user through different devices which are easy-to-access by the 
user such as telephone calls, mobile phone messages, and emails. It is very fast and very 
familiar for the user to use. In addition, it does not need any special software to be 
downloaded neither in the personal computer nor in the server. Moreover, the managers 
do not have any over head management to manage this method of authentication. 
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Further details pertaining to band authentication can be found in [106]. Listed below are 
the disadvantages of using this method: 
1. Out-of-Band authentication is not secure because an attacker can steal and re-use 
the personal information by harking the call. 
2. Unscrupulous support staff in the organisation may steal the user's personal 
information. 
3. This method is not base on an encrypted data; data is sent as a plain text. This will 
increase the ability of hackers.  
All methods mentioned above suffer from many drawbacks. Thus, finding more 
practical solutions are an essential need. Figure 2.3 shows the summary of the 
advantages and disadvantages of authentication keys. 
Table 2.4 Advantages and disadvantages of Authentication keys 
Authentication Key Details of authentication keys 
Password 
Advantages 
- High customer and verifier acceptance. 
- Well understood. 
Disadvantages 
- Customer needs to use different password for 
different verifier. 
- Customer may forget his password. 
- Generally, people do not follow good instructions to 
choose good password. 
- Attacks works by obtaining the password as only one 
factor. 
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Token 
Advantages 
- Stronger security than using password only. 
- Using two authentication factors. 
- Customers can easy notice if token is stolen or losted. 
Disadvantages 
- It comes with an increase in cost. 
- Token can be stolen or copied. 
- If user forget or loose his token, he will be off service 
- until managing to have another one. 
- Overhead management. 
One-Time-Password 
Advantages 
- Simple to use. 
- Easy to implement. 
Disadvantages 
- Using shared table of password is not safe. 
- Overhead management. 
Biometrics 
Advantages 
- Customers do not need to carry any devices or 
memorize their passwords or personal information. 
Disadvantages 
- Should be used in conjunction with other protection.  
- Biometrics could be stolen or copied. 
- It is not identical every time. 
- Biometrics is static, where it is not recommended. 
- Biometrics is used, in some cases, for public. 
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Knowledge Base 
Advantages 
- Some information is changeable. 
Disadvantages 
- It uses, in almost, fixed number of questions. 
- It not easy for users to memorize a large number of 
information. 
- Over head management. 
- Easy for hackers to follow up the user’s information 
due to its fixed. 
Out-of-Band 
Advantages 
- Very easy, fast and familiar for user to use. 
- No need for any pre installed or implementations. 
Disadvantages 
- It is open to attack for many ways of attacks. 
 
2.6 Authentication Mechanism & Evaluation 
The wide using of online transactions provides a good chance for hackers to penetrate 
the system. Therefore, many authentication mechanisms have been proposed for key 
exchange. The most popular authentication mechanism protocol is Kerberos protocol. It 
is proposed to authenticate the end users to the server. Chapter three discussed Kerberos 
protocol and the problem with it in details. The authentication mechanisms have to be 
evaluated before using, in order to give users more confidence to use these mechanisms. 
Burrows, Abadi and Needham produced a formal logic called BAN logic to evaluate the 
authentication mechanisms protocols [10]. BAN Logic is presented in chapter four. 
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2.6.1 Encryption Algorithms 
Encryption is the process of converting a plaintext message into cipher text which can 
be decoded back into the original message. An encryption algorithm along with a key is 
used in the encryption and decryption of data. There are several types of data 
encryptions which form the basis of network security. Encryption schemes are based on 
block or stream ciphers. The type and length of the keys utilized depend upon the 
encryption algorithm and the amount of security needed. Algorithms play a significant 
role in ensuring the integrity of data. They provide necessary security when 
communications occur over insecure platforms, such as communications that involve 
the internet or outside networks. Below is some of the most popular encryption 
algorithms and how they are used to protect sensitive information. 
2.6.1.1   Symmetric Algorithms 
Symmetric algorithms use a single key to encrypt and decrypt data. These encryption 
algorithms typically work fast and are well suited for encrypting blocks of messages at 
once. The most known example is the DEA (Data Encryption Algorithm) [27] which is 
specified within the DES (Data Encryption Standard) [18]. Triple DES is a more 
reliable version while AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) [15] has become new the 
government standard.  
2.6.1.2    Asymmetric Algorithms 
These types of encryption algorithms involve a pair of relative keys that encode and 
decode messages. One key is used to encrypt data into ciphertext while the other key 
decrypts it back into plaintext. Asymmetric algorithms [96] are more commonly known 
as Public-key cryptography, first introduced in 1978 with RSA encryption [14, 67]. 
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These schemes work by multiplying two large prime numbers to generate a larger 
number that is incredibly difficult to revert to the original form. 
Asymmetric algorithms tend to be slower than their symmetric counterparts. Because of 
this, they aren't recommended for encrypting large amounts of data. The biggest 
advantage to such a scheme lies in the utilization of two keys. Hence the name, the 
public key can be made publicly available, enabling anyone to encrypt private 
messages. However, the message can only be decrypted by the party that owns the 
relative private key. This type of encryption algorithm also provides proof of origin to 
ensure to overall integrity of communications. 
2.6.1.3   Hash Algorithms 
Hash algorithms [74] function by transforming data of arbitrary length into a smaller 
fixed length, more commonly known as a message digest. These types of algorithms are 
considered one-way functions. The generated output varies, making them very efficient 
when it comes to detecting alterations that might have been made to a message. Hash 
algorithms are often generated by the DES algorithm to encrypt online banking 
transactions and other communications where messages can't afford to be corrupted. 
 
2.7 Location-Based Authentication 
A need to develop the security techniques is remaining as long as the wheel of scientific 
progress is in rapid rotation due to that the relationship between continuity and 
existence of modern scientific innovations and the need to find new technologies to 
protect its users is a direct correlation, specialists should not overlook this. Recently, the 
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world has turned to use new methods to verify the user’s identity, especially after the 
huge increase in transfer of data used in wireless networks. Many international reports 
confirm the continued exposure to dangerous hack. “Trust wave’s Global Security 
Report 2010 summarizes findings from the Chicago-based firm’s investigations of 200-
plus data breaches last year as well as 1,800 penetration tests of clients’ computer 
systems to find vulnerabilities. It is the third such annual report Trust wave has done, 
and the number of data breaches has gone up every year, according to Nicholas J. 
Percoco, senior vice president of SpiderLabs, Trustwave’s investigative and research 
division. Hackers went after payment card data in 98% of the cases Spider Labs 
investigated” [42].  As a result of the noticeable increase in online transaction token, 
biometrics and smart card are no longer widely used as before as they are cumbersome 
to manage and vulnerable to new attacks such as phishing attack [53] or a replay attack 
[61].  
Location-Based Authentication is a new technique that uses the user’s physical location 
address as a key to authenticate identity [5]. There are different forms that can be used 
to verify the user’s physical location. A well known form is by using a sensor device. It 
is applied within a short scope, such as implementing the sensing wireless network in 
one building floor. This research includes the subject of sensor because there is a direct 
relation between them; sensors are using to verify the location of the user weather he is 
using a legitimate position or not. If the sensor node can receive the user’s signal, that is 
mean that the user is inside the legitimate region and so far he can use the services. This 
location-based authentication is the main scope of this research.  Another method is by 
using GPS receiver that can receive the address of the user’s physical location from 
anywhere in the world. It is an intelligent sensor which is used to monitor user’s 
physical location and environmental conditions such as, temperature, sound, vibration 
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and pressure. Both forms have the same policy, which is using the sensing facility to 
know the exact location of the user. In the next section, the method of the sensor 
operation, authentication of the user identity and what are the interfaced challenges are 
demonstrated. Note that you can skip this part and read a shortcut causes, available end 
of the section, which led to the search for the possible adoption of the GPS signal in 
order to verify the identity of the user.  
2.7.1 Sensors 
Wireless sensors network consists of many nodes. Each of node’s hardware consist of 
microprocessor, storage area for data, sensors, Analog-To-Digital converters, a data 
transceiver, controllers that tie the pieces together and energy sources. Nodes can 
communicate to each other, sending and receiving the data, by using different protocols. 
The communications using sensors wireless network is different than those using the 
Internet; in Internet, the user named the server and send group of information, where 
sensor networks users are verified by many attributes such as sensor value range or 
physical location. User’s request moves node by node from the production point to the 
server point.  Root node can send a packet to its neighbor and this packet must identify 
the sender, the receiver and the distance between them. The node which receives the 
packet can resend it to another node. Therefore, packet can be received by more 
distance nodes 
Professionals face many challenges to substantiate the source of the message. It is very 
easy for the administrator to find the rogue machine in case of using wired network, 
because signals can be physically traced from transmitter port to the receiver port. 
Whereas, in case of wireless network it cannot get information about the physical 
location of rogue machine. The administrator cannot know what hardware or software 
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that rogue machine are using or what is the broadcasting power level of the rogue 
machine. Therefore, there is a good potential for the intruder to keep going in wireless 
network. A full detail pertaining to sensors can be found in [2]. There are two main 
ways which can be used to pretend the signal of wireless networking; misbehaviour 
nodes and decrypt the signal. The next two sections give details about each of them. 
2.7.1.1  Misbehaviour Nodes 
The failure to maintain the efficiency of the node may cause a lack of knowledge of the 
official position source of the message, and this is what helps attackers to keep going in 
their works. Thus, it is very important to find techniques which can help to follow up 
the efficiency of the nodes in order to suppress the basis of the intruder. Below are 
different ways that cause the misbehavior problem and a lot of techniques were 
proposed to defense against these ways.   
1. Distortion 
It is known that the signal may send in free space, especially in dealing with huge 
institute, making them vulnerable to distortion by several factors such as the weather or 
collision with other signals  sent at the same time [107]. This type of hack is called 
Rushing Attack [47]. This type of hacking has been concerned to disrupt the arrival of 
the message to the target. The hacker sends a quick signal to all nodes adjacent to the 
target before the arrival of the official signal, and thus prevents the official letter from 
reaching the target, as shown in the following picture.  
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Figure 2.7 Rushing Attack 
Another type of attack used to misleading the signal and disable the service is called 
Wormhole Attack [46]. In this type of hacking, the hacker changes the signal’s 
orientation to a different path.  
This distortion would reduce the efficiency of the accuracy of the signal which would 
adversely affect the ability to calculate accurately the position, which will make the 
administrator rejection and has to stop the service or to accept it as a valid signal in spite 
of its vulnerability to penetration.  
To overcome this problem, many techniques are built particular to ensure that the 
message reach the target. One of such is Rashing Attack Prevent (RAP) [47]. This study 
adds a mark for each signal to identify the maximum communication range, which 
examines the neighbouring node.  
Dynamic Source Routing Protocol (DSR) [20, 44, 55, 56, 79] is another study used for 
the protection of the rushing attack. This protocol follows-up on the signal to ensure that 
the signal reaches its intended target. It consists of two main concepts; Route Discovery 
which is used to choose the best nodes to reach the target, and Route Maintenance to 
check whether the node has worked properly or not.  
Target Node 
Source Node 
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Yih-Chun Hu et al produce Packet leashes [45]. This technique is to defend against 
Wormhole Attack. It is determining the distance between two points, assumed by 
geographic leashes, and determines the time needed to send it by temporal leashes, 
which represents the time stamp.  
Another technique on the upgrading of the accuracy of location calculation technique 
called follow-me application [39]. It rests on the continued follow-up to the user 
wherever he went using the equipment and network resources. It uses the theory of non-
typical readings rejected and is called a statistical outlier rejection algorithm. These 
studies are based on the implementation of several main axes; group of monitors 
transfers the user-specific data that are obtained using a fine-grained location system. It 
is then converted to the form of executable applications and compares it with a list of 
the correct data previously stored.  
There is another system to follow up the user's location, which is almost similar to the 
previous study significantly [38, 41, 129, 130]. This study is based on the portable 
badge carried by the staff for the duration of the time. This Badge send a signal 
containing a globally unique code through the ten parts of a second every 15 seconds to 
tell the location of the user and for this reason called “Active Badge”. The sensors 
distributed all over the place receive the signal, explore and translate it into a form that 
can be read and determine whether the user's exists or abroad.  
Hightower et al had adopted another approach in order to reach a high degree of 
accuracy in the calculation of the user's location [40].  
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Figure 2.8. Signals of three base stations 
 In short, the idea is using several base stations for the provision of a strong signal to 
know the limits of allowable work area. Then, the server will adopt the intersect region 
by three different areas. Finally, the server will transfer the data to the site of application 
used by the users. Figure 2.8 shows the general concept of the idea. 
Unfortunately, these studies did not address all problems adequately due to many 
disadvantages. One of the greatest disadvantages encountered in these studies is that it 
does not respect the privacy of the user, causing them discomfort and privacy concern. 
This may lead them to make a deliberate act of failure in the hardware to stop 
monitoring them. Moreover, Infrared (IR) signal cannot penetrate walls in comparison 
with the radio signal [66]. Furthermore, these techniques have been facing several 
challenges due to dependence on staff such as wearing the badges. The employee may 
forget to wear it deliberately in order to conceal their where about and hence put it 
away, which provides an opportunity for another user to get access to the services. 
2.  Redundancy and Delay: 
The wireless network based on the distribution of a number of adjacent nodes which are 
used to transmit the signal from one node to another until the signal reaches the base 
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station. There are many situations where the system has been enforced to use a greater 
number of nodes to cover a larger area of work, which would mean a large number of 
sending and receiving signals. This will lead to the emergence of the problem of delays. 
Clearly, the node will be obliged to receive many unwanted messages, which would 
cause delay and waste of the node’s energy. It should be taken into account that the 
reduction of the number of nodes is not an ideal solution due to the need of a large 
number of nodes in many cases.  
Denial of Service attack (DoS) is one of the most common types of wireless signals 
attack that cause a delay problem. There are numerous forms which show this kind of 
hacking. One of the forms is when the penetrator jams the sent signals. It is also 
happens when a hacker sends a large number of messages which would drain the power 
of the node, point to mobilize memory, storage capacity, hence, blocking the nodes or at 
least the cause of inaccuracy in its work. In other words, this method depends on the 
hack of pumping several signals to fill the line between the node and the base station, it 
is called in some cases Path Denial of Service (PDoS) [134].  
Jing Deng et al have produced a study made by identifying the transmitted signals every 
second to keep decreasing the number of sent signals and so far decreasing the 
possibility of the overload [23]. Although many other studies have been proposed to 
overcome this problem [36, 70, 78, 87],  Unfortunately, the problem still exists. attacker 
can use Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS) [86]; attacker uses many 
computers to attack the network. In other words, multiple sources can be used from 
different locations to attack the network at the same time. “In DDOS attacks, attackers 
first explore the vulnerability in a particular system and thus he makes the first tools for 
the attack called master. Then the master uses other large amount of computer for the 
attack which is called agents. Now the attackers will instruct those machines by using a 
Chapter 2:  Literature  Review 
38 
 
command. Therefore with the command of the attackers the master computer will 
follow its command and it transfer that instruction of command to different agents. Thus 
there will be a huge network created with large number of agents and master. Therefore 
when these all agents target the victim it will be almost impossible to handle that 
amount of request send by the agents and therefore the particular server or website will 
be immobilizes and it can’t give service to the legitimate user”3.  
3. Weak Performance 
The lack of attention to many things connected to node will lead of course, to attacks of 
the sent messages. There are many reasons that may lead to node misbehavior. They are 
as follows: 
 Weakness in battery. One of the most important elements that control the 
misbehavior of the node is the power of the battery. The weaknesses in sensors’ 
batteries may cause a clear difference in the degree of power of communication, 
which is making it difficult for the administrator to determine where the signal is 
coming from. This will give hackers a good chance of penetration[3]. In [3] a 
study is carried out in an attempt to obtain the required effectiveness from the 
node. This study divided the organization to multiple domains; each domain has 
specific signal strength and is not allowed to accept more or less of it. It has 
identified the minimum and maximum time to send the message. The most 
important objective of this study is to raise the accuracy of the signal by 
reducing the number of messages sent and received. Therefore, the batteries will 
be able to be working properly for a longer time. It is worth mentioning that 
there are many studies which have focused on this topic [122, 126, 136].  
                                                 
3
 http://freshtutorial.com/distributed-of-denial-service-attack/ 
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 Broken node. If the node has fault software, this may lead to flood of sending 
the message. Some techniques have focused on the tracing the signal from the 
source to the destination to ensure the quality of the transmissions. One of these 
techniques is called Watchdog feature [64] that was added to the node to follow 
up and determine if the efficiency of the node work is effective or not. And then 
be avoided by using the Pathrater feature if bad efficiency. When node sends the 
signal, the node’s watchdog will verify whether the next node sent the signal or 
not, by listening promiscuously to the next node. The Pathrater in the case of the 
misbehavior will choose another node to be sure that the signal is sent properly. 
A Bayesian method is another strategy; the main trust of this method is taking 
subsequent observation of signal strengths and so far, acknowledge where the 
device might be [73].  However, data has to be trained in order to build the 
system. If error occurs in the training step, the robustness will be reduced and 
such errors can give the intruder good opportunity to disguise their location.  
In another technique [125] which follows on Bayesian methods, and is called 
Server-side indoor location-sensing. This system does the test with the client 
before and records the different possibilities of transmission power of the client. 
The administrator can address all possible elusive tactics for rogue machine. 
In the subsequent evolution of the Bayesian approach to localisation theory, a 
group of researchers identified its shortcomings as the lack of precision in the 
calculation of the user's location through the working on the sensing wireless 
network, and they have refer this to several causes [125]. One of these reasons is 
the complex links between the distributed nodes, which may affect the accuracy 
of the message. Another reason is the noisy electromagnetic interference which 
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is caused by weatherproof such as sun spot and thunder storms that may weaken 
the power and accuracy of the received and sent message.  
Another technique is to find the location of the node is to estimate for the 
unknown position of the node [26]. In case of using thousands of nodes, the 
possibilities of problems which can occur will be increased. In this study, the 
administrator does not need to know all the nodes in the wireless network. The 
network contains number of known nodes and others are unknown. If one node 
can contact another node, then the nodes are nearing to each other and they are 
within the permitted area. In this methodology, all nodes have to perform a 
centralized computation and communicate the information with a single 
computer in the network. The focus here has been on reducing the cost and the 
difficulty of management in diminishing interest in the degree of precision 
required. Because most institutions that use large number of sensors such as 
universities are available for all to visit. Therefore, it is easy for hackers to 
threaten the system. 
2.7.1.2  Decoding the Signal 
It has previously been stated that the signal is transferred over a cable or free space, 
which would make it vulnerable to be compromised and stolen. The possibility of 
decrypting the signal and change the contents gives the hackers a greater chance to 
penetrate the network and get the service. There are many studies that focus on the 
encryption of the signals before sending them. Most of these studies have adopted to 
encrypt the signal by a preset password using the method of one-way-hash chain [139]. 
Moreover, it uses a time stamp to prevent the replay attack [61]. It cannot be installed at 
a specific time to transmit the signal, therefore, the time identification has to be period 
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of time such as from one second to three seconds. This certainly will give hackers good 
chance of a breakthrough, especially in the case of using a strong transmitter. Details of 
these techniques are as follows: 
One of the suggested solutions to ensure that penetration is the construction of a secure 
channel by the parties, such as choosing a key in advance before starting to mutual the 
signal between them. This method is called priori trust relationship [81].  
Hailun Tan produced a new security scheme using one way key chain [124]. This study 
divides the nodes into different groups according to the differences in the distance 
between the node and the base station. And each group has a different key, this key is 
one-way hash chain [61]; it is a symmetric cryptography key which is a known number, 
but it is difficult to return it back to find out its source. After collecting the group's 
information, the sensor node will examine the validity of the used key to accept or reject 
the packet. This study is very similar to the study of [115]. The difference between the 
two is that, this study is supporting multi-hop network, where the study in [115] support 
only one-hope network.   
TESLA is another technique which is relying on encryption of the signal by using one-
way chain key for key exchange in addition to time stamp to prevent replay attack [98]. 
This technique will increase the size of the packet to 24 bytes. Furthermore, one-way-
chain key does not fit into the memory of the sensor node. Because of this, TESLA has 
been improved to πTESLA [99] and multi-level πTESLA [76] in an attempt to reduce 
the number of sent signals in order to overcome the overload problem. But this is not a 
viable solution, because the volume of sent messages is still considerably large.  
Moreover, Tong Zhou and Krishnendu Chakrabarty in [127] concentrated on watchdog 
protocol with πTESLA [13]. They produced a Constrained Function Based Message 
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Authentication Scheme for Sensor Networks (CFA). Other similar studies are [28, 108, 
114, 138].   
Kyusuk Han and Kwangjo Kim produced a model called Light Weight Security Model 
[37]. This model discussed the problem of protecting the user identity taking into 
account the importance of maintaining user privacy. This study elaborates in detail 
because of many similarities with the Kerberos protocol which is a key component of 
this thesis as will be explained in the next chapter. However, this study does not depend 
on the sensing location in the definition of the user’s position, but considered it as an 
initial stage prior to the authentication phase. Light Weight Security Model includes 
three main components; “C” is a client, “SP” is a service provider and “OP” as a trusted 
operator. Assume C and OP share key KC and OP and SP share key KSP. C tries to prove 
his location to the SP, while SP shall examine the validity of location data transmitted 
from C in collaboration with the trusted party OP as a certified as follows: 
C asked the SP to get access to the service. Then, the SP requests client’s physical 
location information (LocInfo). C requests the proof of his location information from 
OP to be sent to SP. Then, OP sends to C:  
Enc{MACKSP (IDC, LocInfo), MACKC (LocInfo, MACKSP(IDC, LocInfo) )  ) 
This message includes two parts; the first one is encrypted by Kc, MACKC (LocInfo, 
MACKSP(IDC, LocInfo) ), which is only known by C and OP, so far, C can decrypt this 
part of the message. The second part is encrypted by Ksp, MACKSP (IDC, LocInfo), this 
part of the message is a ticket for C to be sent to prove his location information to the 
SP. C should be sure to match MACKSP(IDC, LocInfo)  from the message with 
MACKSP(IDC, LocInfo)  from the ticket. If it matches, then C is assured that MACKC 
(LocInfo, MACKSP(IDC, LocInfo))  is not forged, Then, C continues operation. There 
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after, C sends IDC, Enc(LocInfo, MACKSP (IDC, LocInfo))  to  SP. Then, SP decrypt 
the received message and match the LocInfo in the ticket with LocInfo which is out of 
the ticket. Figure 2.9 shows the steps of Light Weight Security Model. 
Figure 2.9: steps of Light Weight Security Model. 
The last step of this model is updating the key. OP and SP will create a new key K’SP, 
so, next time K’SP is used to generate MACK'SP (IDC, LocInfo'). In addition, the 
message has a time stamp to avoid reuse it again. As mentioned before, this technique is 
similar to Kerberos. In the next chapter, Kerberos will be discussed in detail and clarify 
the weaknesses associated with it. 
The next table is to show in brief the list of these challenges, suggestion solutions and 
classify the risks expected to occur in the absence of finding suitable solutions to these 
problems. 
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Tabel 2.5  Over view the challenges of using sensors 
Challenges needs to be done The effects of no solutions 
Distortion The use of techniques to reduce 
the distortion and ensure that the 
message reached the target clearly 
The arrival of the message is 
unclear or not true, which may 
lead to be rejected 
Redundancy 
and Delay 
Reduce the number of sent 
messages and making sure that 
there is no effect on the quality of 
the work. 
Reject the message because of its 
use more time than the allotted 
Weak 
performance 
The use of techniques to ensure 
effective tools of nodes 
Ineffective Work, and therefore 
provides weak points enable 
hackers to penetrate the network 
and access to the service. 
Authentication Signals have to be encrypted 
before sending signals to avoid 
penetration 
Easily penetrable, and the 
representation of penetrating the 
same as if the official user 
The following list summarises the problems that are still plaguing the sensing wireless 
network regarding stopping hackers accessing users’ privacy: 
1. Although there are of studies undertaken to tackle the problem of overload, the 
problem still exists. The main reason for this is the need to use cryptographic 
techniques and indicate that it needs to occupy a large volume of the signal. For 
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the ease this problem, specialist must find techniques of strong protection using a 
small size or should develop the sensor devices to accommodate large volume 
data. 
2. The method used in the protection of the wireless is still relatively expensive. This 
is because of the need to use multiple passwords depending on the locations. 
3. The used protection techniques depend on the user to determine their passwords. 
Thus, the degree of protection will depend on how the user follows the correct 
methods in the selection of passwords. 
4. The dependence on time in the systems of protection does not lead to feel more 
confident. The attacker may use a quick devices to accomplish the task during the 
period allowed. In addition, the administrator can not reduce the period to the stop 
the hacker because it could lead to the inability of the legitimate user to access the 
services. 
5. A lot of definitions that have been proposed by both the user and the 
administrator. Sometimes this will require specialist kills and knowledge. 
6. In some systems, the follow-up movements of the users are not acceptable to 
many of them. This may lead the user to abort the work in multiple ways. 
Using a sensor to find an accurate user’s physical location in order to verify his identity 
has been faced by many problems as mentioned above.  Although many strategies have 
been proposed to defend against these challenges, it is still suffering from many 
problems. This thesis proposed another way which is more accurate and robust than 
using sensors. It is using the facilities of GPS signal. GPS has been used to track 
addresses and courier services, but it is not used in the science of the Authentication. In 
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the next section, a detail of the GPS signal and why it can be used to authenticate the 
user’s identity are presented. 
2.7.2 Global Position System (GPS) 
The Global Positioning System (GPS) was designed to provide global weather, 
navigation and timing information to military users in all weather conditions regardless 
of day and night, anywhere on the Earth which has an unobstructed view of the four or 
more GPS satellites. Every physical location has a unique location signature created by 
a Location Signature Sensor (LSS). It is read by microwave signals transmitted by the 
thirty satellite constellation of the GPS. It consists of three main factors as presented in 
the next section.  
2.7.2.1   Factors of GPS. 
The GPS consist of three main factors, as listed below: 
1.  The space factor consists of a 32 operating satellites. They distributed over the 
sky and constantly moving a complete orbits in every 11 hours, as shown in 
figure 2.10. Every satellite transmits one-way signals indicating its current 
position and time.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10 distributed satellite around the earth. 
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The first satellite was launched in 1978 and they were completed them in 2008. 
Figure 2.11 shows the availability of these satellites.  
 
 
 
1. The user is the second factor. This factor contains the GPS receiver, which 
receives the signals from the GPS satellites and uses these signals in order to 
calculate the user’s position co-ordinates.  
2. The Ground factor are control stations. There are several ground stations in 
different places all over the world. The master station is in Colorado. The others 
are in Hawaii, Kwajalein, Diego Garcia, Ascension Island, Cape Canaveral and 
Florida. These stations are constructed to monitor the efficiency of the satellites 
signal through the occasional command manoeuvres and administer the satellite 
clocks. It monitors the movement of GPS satellites and updates the date of 
satellite. Monitoring the signal using this factor is a very important in order to 
reach a public confidence in using it safely.  
In recent years, GPS has been used in many places such as, cars, planes, construction 
equipment and boats. The GPS may become a worldwide utility and can be described as 
a consumer item.  
Figure 2.11 Availability of the satellites [103] 
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2.7.2.2   Determine the Precise User’s Location. 
In order to determine the user’s location, user’s GPS receiver has to be viewed by 3 or 
more satellites. This is based on calculating the distances between the receiver and the 
position of each one of the three satellites, and then performing some mathematics 
operations to calculate the position using time of transition and the speed of light [58]. 
To illustrate this, suppose an object is 2 miles away from a main selected reference 
point. One could not know where it is exactly because it could be 2 miles in any 
direction from the main selected reference point. With only this information, the number 
of possibilities of the location could be huge number. But, if one is told you that are also 
in 2 miles from another closer reference point, now one eliminate the possibilities 
numbers of the exact location. It would be known that it is somewhere perimeters of 
these two spheres intersect, as shown in figure 2.12, but still the number of possibilities 
of my location is high.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12 Intersection of two spheres 
Using another sphere it will help to come closer to the exact location. If one is in 1 mile 
closer, this will further reduce the number of possibilities of the preferred location. In 
fact, the more spheres you add, the more accurate position you achieve. Figure 2.13 
shows how the intersection of three satellites. Details of determining the user’s location 
can be found in [141] 
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Figure 2.13 Intersection of three spheres 
Thus, there are two main things must be known in order to calculate the user’s physical 
address; the location of three or more GPS satellites and the distance between the GPS 
receiver and three satellites. GPS receiver calculates the distance between the GPS 
receiver and the satellite by measuring the time it takes the signal to travel from the 
satellite to the GPS receiver. This signal is a radio signal and it uses the speed of light to 
travel. So, GPS receiver will calculate the distance by multiply the speed by the time. 
To do this, the clock used by both the satellite and the receiver are synchronized and 
very accurate.  “A clock error of 1/100 second, which is difficult to imagine but quite 
common from car races or skiing races, would in GPS navigation lead to a mistake in 
the position of about 3000 km” [43]. Therefore, It is not easy for any entity in 
cyberspace to pretend to be in any place other than where its Location Signature Sensor 
(LSS) actually is [24, 133]. Moreover, the GPS signal is designed to be protected 
against the jam [35]. Examining the possibility of jamming the GPS signal code will be 
presented in chapter 5. These are other reasons that give high confidence for the GPS to 
be used to authenticate the user’s identity safely. Below is detail about position 
determination with GPS: 
“In a considerably simplified approach, each satellite is sending out signals with the 
following content: I am satellite X, my position is Y and this information was sent at 
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time Z. In addition to its own position, each satellite sends data about the position of 
other satellites. These orbit data (ephemeris und almanac data) are stored by the GPS 
receiver for later calculations. For the determination of its position on earth, the GPS 
receiver compares the time when the signal was sent by the satellite with the time the 
signal was received. From this time difference the distance between receiver and 
satellite can be calculated. If data from other satellites are taken into account, the 
present position can be calculated by trilateration (meaning the determination of a 
distance from three points). This means that at least three satellites are required to 
determine the position of the GPS receiver on the earth surface. The calculation of a 
position from 3 satellite signals is called 2D-position fix (two-dimensional position 
determination). It is only two dimensional because the receiver has to assume that it is 
located on the earth surface (on a plane two-dimensional surface). By means of four or 
more satellites, an absolute position in a three dimensional space can be determined. A 
3D-position fix also gives the height above the earth surface as a result. 
Simplified, the position determination by means of a GPS works on the sample 
principle as the distance of thunderstorms can be judged: the time is measured between 
lightning and the following thunder. The speed of light is so high that the delay between 
the time where the flash hits the ground and the time the observer sees the flash can be 
neglected. The speed of sound in the earth’s atmosphere is approximately 340 m/s. This 
means that for example a difference of 3 seconds between lightning and thunder 
corresponds to approximately 1 km distance to the thunderstorm. However, this 
procedure is not yet a determination of a position, but only a determination of a 
distance. If different people on fixed positions would determine the time span between 
lightning and thunder, this would allow the determination of the position where the flash 
hit the ground! 
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In the following an explanation is given, how the position determination by GPS works. 
For simplification, in the first step we assume that the earth is a two-dimensional disk. 
This allows us to do some understandable sketches for illustration. The principle can 
then be transferred to the model of a three-dimensional globe. 
Figure 2.14 Position determination with two satellites  
 
In Figure 2.14 on the left, the time needed by a signal to travel from the first of two 
satellites to the receiver was determined to be 4 s. (In reality this value is far too high. 
As the signals travel with the speed of light (299 792 458,0 m/s), the actual time span 
for signals from the satellite to the receiver lies in the range of 0.07 s.) 
Based on this information, we can at state that the receiver is positioned somewhere on 
a circle with a radius of 4 s around the first satellite (left circle). If we perform the same 
procedure with a second satellite (right circle), we get two points of intersection. On one 
of the two points the receiver must be situated. Now we have used two satellites. But the 
process is called trilateration, not dilateration so don't we need a third satellite? We may 
use a third satellite but we could also assume that the receiver is located somewhere 
close to the earth's surface and not deep in space, so we can neglect point B and know 
that the receiver must be found on point A. The area in the picture above which shaded 
grey is the region in which GPS signals are supposed to be “realistic”. Positions outside 
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this area are discarded, so is point B. This assumption replaces the third satellite which 
would in theory be required for the process of trilateration. In this example an 
unequivocal position is obtained from only two satellites. So we just need a third 
satellite for a third dimension and that's it? Well, in principle yes. But 
the problem lies in the determination of the exact runtime of signals. As explained 
above, satellites impose a sort of time stamp on each transmitted data package. We 
know that all clocks of satellites are absolutely precise (they are atomic clocks after all) 
but the problem is the clock in our GPS receiver. Atomic clocks being too expensive, 
our GPS receivers are based on conventional quartz clocks which are comparatively 
inaccurate. What does this mean in practice? 
 
Figure 2.15  2D position determination with 2 satellites and clock error 
 
Let's stick to our example and suppose the clock in our receiver is 0.5 seconds early 
compared to the clock in the satellite. The runtime of the signal seems to be 0.5 s longer 
than it actually is as shown in Figure 2.15. This leads to the assumption that we are on 
point B instead of point A. The circles that intersect in point B are called pseudoranges. 
They are called “pseudo” as long as no correction of the synchronisation errors (bias) of 
the clocks has been performed. Depending on the accuracy of the clock in the GPS 
receiver, the determined position will be more or less wrong. For the practice of GPS 
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based navigation this would mean that no determined position can ever be of any use, as 
the runtimes of the signals are so short, that any clock error has an overwhelming 
influence on the result. To achieve an accuracy of 10 m of the position, the runtime of 
the signal must be precise to 0.00000003 seconds. 
As atomic clocks are no option in GPS receivers, the problem is solved in another and 
quite elegant way; If a third satellite is taken into account for the calculation of the 
position as shown in Figure 2.16 , another intersection point is obtained: in case that all 
clocks are absolutely precise.  
 
Figure 2.16  2D position determination with 3 satellites and corrected clock error 
 
point A would be obtained, corresponding to the actual position of the receiver. 
In case of the receiver clock being 0.5 s early, the three intersection points B are 
obtained. In this case the clock error stands out immediately. If now the time of the 
receiver clock is shifted until the three intersection points B merge to A, the clock error 
is corrected and the receiver clock is synchronized with the atomic clocks in the 
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satellites. The GPS receiver can now be regarded as an atomic clock itself. The 
distances to the satellites, formerly regarded as pseudoranges, now correspond to the 
actual distances and the determined position is accurate” [43]. 
2.7.2.3    GPS Signal: C/A and P-Code. 
Each GPS satellite transmits two signals; a secure encrypted signal exclusively for 
military users called P-code signal and a non secure civilian signal called coarse 
acquisition or the civilian code (C/A). The length of P-code is 6.1871 × 10
12
 bits long 
(6,187,100,000,000 bits) and repeat only once a week. They are broadcast for two 
different frequencies and the military signal provides better security than civilian 
signals. The military signal is also designed to resist electronic attack.  P-code has been 
encrypted by modulation with the W-code to generate the Y-code in order to prevent 
any attacks by unauthorized users. Moreover, P(Y) code has good property, which is if 
you have a snapshot of received P(Y) code of your position, you can identify the 
location. On the other hand, it is difficult to ascertain what P(Y) code should have done 
if you know where you are [116]. Again, using the facilities of P(Y) code increases the 
confidence of using it to authenticate the user’s identity safely. For the ranging codes 
and navigation message to travel from the satellite to the receiver, they must 
be modulated onto a carrier frequency. In the case of the original GPS design, two 
frequencies are utilized; one at 1575.42 MHz (10.23 MHz × 154) called L1; and a 
second at 1227.60 MHz (10.23 MHz × 120), called L2. Besides redundancy and 
increased resistance to jamming, a critical benefit of having two frequencies transmitted 
from one satellite is the ability to measure directly, and therefore remove, the 
ionospheric delay error for that satellite. 
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2.7.2.4    Accuracy of the GPS. 
There are a number of factors that affect the GPS accuracy, such as noise sources from 
the radio signals, weather conditions, physical obstructions and the natural objects such 
as a mountains or tall buildings between the satellite and the GPS. The best environment 
to achieve the best accurate determination of the position can happened only when the 
satellite and receiver have a clear view of each, in order to increase the accuracy. 
Differential GPS (DGPS) has been proposed. DGPS uses a known position of one 
receiver and obtain the different between the real range and the pseudo range to correct 
the error and have a better result. Figure 2.17 shows the idea of DGPS. Thus, It has been 
noted that the GPS gives an accurate location output [82]. The increased security of the 
GPS have been discussed by many researchers, some of these are [24, 75, 82, 111].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.17  Differential GPS 
 
 
2.7.2.5    Authentication in GPS  
Since the military signal is not easy to spoof or jam and has a high level of accuracy, it 
has attracted the attention of using this signal to authenticate the user identity. It is 
contributed that user can capture the P(Y) code and there is no presumption or 
assumption her to get the P(Y) code from the military institution. 
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User can store the P(Y) code to verify his physical address signature to the server. 
Therefore, if the administrator determines where users are allowed to work through in 
advance, the military P(Y) signal could serve to publicize the location of the user profile 
and thus his identity. We do not say that the user will send his captured P(Y) code to the 
server as it is received, because it may be stolen by hackers, and re-use it later on the 
basis that they are a legitimate use. But, what may make sense is that the server may ask 
number of questions to the user that the answers are related to his location signature 
(P(Y) code).  Table 2.5 shows the reasons that can lead to the use of GPS to authenticate 
the user identity. 
Table 2.6 Reasons to use the GPS to authenticate the user identity. 
No. Reasons leads to use P(Y) code to authenticate the user’s identity 
1. Gives an accurate location output. 
2. Cannot be spoofed. 
3. Cannot be jammed. 
3. Not easy to be decrypted. 
4. Available in all weather, conditions, day and night, anywhere on the Earth. 
5. Relatively not expensive. 
6. Commonly accepted. 
GPS however is used only outdoors in the sense that the receiver should have a direct 
"view" to at least four GPS satellites. In the next section, details of N-Kerberos protocol 
using the facility of the GPS are given.  
As there are no strategies that used the GPS signal in wireless network for the purpose 
of the authentication. One study used the GPS to increase the accuracy of the sensors. 
The detail of this study is as follows: 
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In July 2002, a group proposed a study to enhance the wireless network security using 
Global Position System (GPS). The signal may be beyond the limits of the building and 
so far, the attacker can capture the signal if their position is close to the building. This 
study is aiming to disable the signal out of the limit of the building; Authors used a 
wireless piconet network device in addition to GPS receiver; GPS to determine and 
provide earth coordinates to gatekeeper of wireless network [11].  
Figure 2.18 shows wireless network devices, the first one inside the authorised building 
permitted it to have authorised access to the wireless network. The attacker building is 
not permitted to have authorized access to the wireless network. GPS signal has been 
added in addition to the sensor’s signal because GPS signal can help the administrator to 
define the exact limit of the building, where this can not be done by the signal of the 
sensors. Although attacker can be within the limit of the sensor’s signal, his signal will 
be rejected because his GPS signal is out of the definition of the autherised building. 
Figure 2.19 shows the process flow of authorization of a piconet wireless network 
device within defined absolute earth coordinates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.18: Wireless network devices 
 
Piconet 
Security 
server 
Piconet GPS 
Piconet GPS 
Authorised Building 
Attacker Building 
Chapter 2:  Literature  Review 
58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.19 process flow of authorization of a piconet wireless network 
 
In fact, this study did not take into account many questions such as: 
It does not provide the type of the GPS signal that are going to be used. In addition, it 
did not study the quality of the civilian or military signal.  
The civilian signal is not secure, as explained before. In addition, all areas of the 
building must be covered. This may requires the implementation of many GPS receivers 
in different places in the building. 
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2.8 Justification of the Proposed Research  
 
The world still suffers from the penetration of the user's privacy, despite the availability 
of several protection techniques. These techniques rely on raising the level of 
encryption code and training the users to use the protection system efficiently in order to 
develop its performance. Unfortunately, the problem still exists in two specific 
objectives: 
1. The degree of the strength of the encryption code depends on the skill of the 
developer. Note that in many cases, the level of the used encryption is not 
enough. In many cases, users do not have good skills, which lead to provide 
an opportunity for hackers to penetrate. 
2. Training the users to use the system is not enough to make sure that the use 
of the system was properly. In another word, nothing to force the users 
technically to pursue what is required.  
This study uses the geographic location address as a new authentication factor. This 
address achieved from the GPS system and has been encrypted using a very efficient 
technique that making it difficult to penetrate. Moreover, user has been enforced to 
follow the right steps, otherwise, the system will not work. The details will be explained 
in the following chapters. 
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2.9 Summary 
This chapter clarified why it is essential to have authentication in order to reduce the 
likely hood of the theft user’s identity. The authentication factors were specified in 
details and showed the methods of using more than one factor at a time. Several 
authentication keys, were discussed and presented how they functioned, advantages and 
disadvantages associated with each key. Since the ability and audacity of hackers has 
been increase in recent years, the computer world also needs to enhance the level of user 
identity authentication. It is felt that the authentication strategies available so far are not 
sufficiently secure. The next part of the chapter highlighted inadequacies of other 
methods of authentication and the issues pertaining to concerns of data protection, 
especially with the emergence of the wireless network. This main factor is the user's 
physical location. The challenges encountered by professionals regarding data 
protection in using sensors, such as the overload of signals, misbehavior nodes, 
redundancy and the authentication of the signals. In addition, several studies that aimed 
to protect the data sending and receiving signals against hackers have been reviewed. It 
is felt, there are still concerns with regards to privacy of the end user.  
The application of Global Position System (GPS) technology is considered in order to 
address the issue surrounding privacy of the user. Details of the facilities of the GPS 
signal have been presented in order to conclude that it would use in the authentication of 
the user’s identity. 
 In this regard, a new protocol is proposed using the services of GPS to verify and 
authenticate the identity of the user in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: 
Kerberos and N-Kerberos Protocols 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Most organizations use online communication rather than more traditional forms. 
Online communication procedures are faster and relatively more cost effective 
compared to traditional physical communication. However, online systems provide 
opportunity for hackers and intruders to carry out malicious acts. With these challenges 
in mind, security specialists have adopted using of data encryption programs to protect 
and secure sent and received messages during the process of communications. For this 
purpose, many encryption codes, such as MD5 [109], DES [18, 25] or RSA [14, 67] 
have been devised. Unfortunately, despite the adoption of encryption of messages and 
strong encryption programs, users are still prone to persistent penetrations. This can be 
attributed to many reasons; in some instances, hackers are able to crack the encryption 
program. For example, although RSA is one of the most powerful encryption codes, 
certain security protocols that use RSA remain susceptible to attack [6, 7, 16, 68, 105]. 
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Another reason is that users do not necessarily follow protection instructions [63]. So 
far, most people do not feel that online communication is a secure environment. In this 
regard, a different approach is adopted compared to the conventional method of 
software encryption where the user may not necessarily follow the precautions expected 
of them. 
In this chapter, the meaning of the protocol and its key features are demonstrated. 
Kerberos protocol, which is the most popular protocols of key exchange, is presented. 
Details of its beginning and causes of its evolution are presented, then the problems 
associated with it are analysed. Furthermore, in order to enhance the features of 
Kerberos, GPS technologies are incorporated.  
The remainder of this chapter is set out as follows: what is the protocol and details of 
how it works are clarified in section 3.2. Section 3.3 gives the details of Needham 
Schroder and Kerberos protocols, Needham Schroeder protocol are also analysed and its 
problem and limitations are presented. Then, Kerberos is considered to solve 
Needham’s problem. Needham problem will be clarified in section 3.3.1. Attack in 
Kerberos is described in section 3.4. A new form of Kerberos called N-Kerberos is 
introduced in Section 3.5. The summary is discussed in section 3.6. 
 
3.2 What is The Protocol? 
The protocol is a set of ordered messages to describe the communication between two 
participants. Participants can be clients or services. Establishing a secure 
communications through insecure open network is the main concern for any security 
communication protocol; the aim of such protocols is to ensure that the exchange route 
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is secure and it can be used for key exchanging process. These protocols rely on two 
main points, which are: 
1. Encryption code. 
2. Using a nonce. 
The first point is that the message has to be encrypted using an encryption key. This key 
must be shared between the two participants only. The sender must encrypt the message 
using the key which is agreed upon with the receiver before sending the message.  
Otherwise, the receiver will not recognize the message. Where the second point is a 
message must includes a nonce, such as a random number or time stamp. Nonce stands 
for number used once. It is a random number issued in an authentication protocol or 
time stamp to ensure that old communications cannot be used in the future [10]. 
Wide Mouth Frog protocol [1] is selected as an example to understand what is the 
protocol and how does it works. It contains two messages; the first one is from the 
client asking the server to communicate with the other participant as shown in figure 
3.1.   
  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Wide Mouth Frog Protocol 
Figure 3.2 shows the description of each character used in Wide Mouth protocol. S is 
the server, A and B are the participants or the machines, sa NN ,  are nonces. If the nonce 
is time stamp, the user will be sure that the message has been recently sent. K is a key 
generated by two participants. A and B need to communicate together using the abK  
 
 
sb
as
Kabs
Kaba
AKNBS
BKNASA
,,::2
,,,::1


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through the recommendation of server. A and B trust server S. S produces the key during 
the execution of the protocol. Communications between the server (S) and participants 
(A and B) will be by asK  and bsK  respectively; these keys have to be known by only 
both participants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Characters’ meaning 
The description of the protocol is as follows: 
A reads the clock, obtaining the current time N, create his request and send it to the 
server with message 1. 
Message1: 
A sends its chosen session key ( abK ) and the time stamp ( aN ) to S, encrypted with its 
private authentication server key ( asK ). Every message should have two conditions in 
order to be secure; encrypted and has a nonce verification [10]. The following list 
shows the analysis of the protocol. 
 asK  is the shared key between A and S. Since S believes asK  as a key known 
only by A and S, and A sees message1 encrypted by key asK , then S concludes 
that A actually sent message1. (In particular, S believes that the message was not 
generated by some attacker).  
 Since the clocks synchronize, it is assumed that, S believes that the message is 
fresh or recently sent.  
S  : Server 
A, B   : Participants or Machines 
Nm  : Time nonce for m 
K  : Key 
X  : Message 
 
asKaba
BKNASA ,,,:
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It is clear now that the two conditions are available in message 1. This would conclude 
that S believes that message 1 is coming from a legitimate participant (A). Message 2 is 
as follows: 
Message 2: 
The two conditions are available in message two; it is encrypted by the shared key 
between S and B ( bsK ) and it includes a nonce ( sN ). Therefore, B would believes that 
the sender is S as explained in message 1. So far, B will start communicate with A 
using abK .  
Unfortunately, there is a big problem in this protocol; the shared key is completely 
determined by A. This may give good chance for hacker to determine a key and hack 
the system. Moreover, A is not guaranteed that B exist, this may requires more 
functionality and capability from the server.  
In the next section, Needham Schroeder protocol [10] will be presented and show why 
it is essential to enhance it.  
 
3.3 Authentication Protocol 
Needham Schroeder and Kerberos are very well known Security protocols which aim to 
establish secure channel for client to communicate. Needham-Schroeder (section 3.3.1) 
and Kerberos (section 3.3.2) protocols are introduced.  
3.3.1    Needham Schroeder protocol 
In 1978, Needham and Schroeder built a distributed authentication protocol [10, 91]. It 
is an exchange key between two participants through the recommendation of a third 
 
bsKabs
AKNBS ,,::2 
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party. Needham and Schroeder protocol consists of five messages as shown in figure 
3.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Needham Schroeder protocol 
Message 1 is the first participant (A) creates and send his request to the server (S). His 
request is a ticket to communicate with the second participant (B). When S receives A's 
request, S will send message 2 including a session key ( abK ) and the ticket 
( 
bsKab
AK , ). This ticket is to be sent from A to B by Message 3. Then, A and B can 
start their conversation securely by message 4 and 5. Needham Schroeder protocol will 
now be analysed and some of its limitations are assessed critically. 
As explained in section 3.2, the message must be encrypted and include a nonce in order 
to conclude that the message is secure. In Needham Schroeder protocol, Participants A 
and S predefined a shared key which is only known by A and S. In addition both clocks 
for A and S are synchronized. A reads the clock, obtaining the current time Na, and sends 
message 1 to S. Then, S sends A the following message: 
Message 2:  
  
 
 
 
ab
ab
bs
as
bs
Kb
Kb
Kab
KKababa
a
NBA
NAB
AKBA
AKKBNAS
NBASA
1::5
::4
,::3
,,,,::2
,,::1





  
as
bs KKababa
AKKBNAS ,,,,:
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Since Kas is only known by A and S, and A sees message 2 encrypted by Kas, then A 
concludes that S actually sent message 2. In addition, since the clocks are synchronized, 
we can assume that A believes that message 2 is fresh or recently sent. 
According to the key conditions of the key exchange protocols, it can be assumed that 
the message 2 is secure. Then, A forwards the received ticket to B by message 3 as 
follows:  
Message 3:  
The aim of message 3 is that B needs to trust Kab in order to be used to communicate 
with A securely. This message has been encrypted using Kbs. Since B believes Kbs as a 
key known only by B and S, and B sees message 3 encrypted by Kbs, then B concludes 
that S actually created this message. In addition, since B believes what the server 
believes, B would believe Kab. But unfortunately, there is no time stamp in this message. 
Therefore, B is unable to confirm that message 3 is not replayed by another user. As 
mentioned before, two compulsory conditions have to exist in the message to be secure. 
Message3 is encrypted by private key, which achieves the first condition. However, the 
second condition cannot be achieved, because there is nothing to prove that the message 
is fresh such as a nonce or time stamp. The main limitation in this protocol is that 
message 3 is not protected by nonce. This will possibly give hackers opportunity to 
replay the message at any time. This protocol was very famous until 1987 and found a 
dormant bug which hung around which is message 3 does not have a nonce, 
undiscovered for a long time. This bug founded by Burrows, Abadi and Needham when 
they produced a measurement tool to check the strongest of the protocol, as will 
described in next chapter. Although, messages 4 and 5 used nuances and encryption key 
to ensure that they are both corresponded, these conversations are not secure because of 
 
bsKab
AKBA ,:
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the bug found in message 3. Improve Needham Schroder or create new key exchange 
protocol has been desirable. As a result, a new form of Needham Schroder called 
Kerberos protocol was developed. In the next section, Kerberos protocol is presented in 
details.  
3.3.2 Kerberos Protocol 
Kerberos is an authentication mechanism protocol designed for TCP/IP networks [8, 57, 
84, 121]. It is a part of MIT’s Project Athena following-on from the Needham 
Schroeder protocol. The environment of Kerberos contains many anonymous 
workstations and servers. All operations such as file storage, mailboxes, print and some 
others are implemented in the server, whereas workstations are mostly used for 
interactions and computing process. As workstations need to access servers to complete 
the processes, they are required to be authenticated. Kerberos is designed to authenticate 
the end-user to the server. To understand how Kerberos works, it will be divided into 
four different steps: 
A. Authentication Exchange:  
 The client requests a ticket from authentication server (AS) to the ticket-granting 
server (TGS) as shown in figure 3.4 (KRB_AS_REQ).  
 AS then checks up the availability of client in its database and generates a session key 
(SK1) to use between the client and the TGS (SK1C-TGS).  
 Kerberos encrypts the SK1 using the client’s secret key. The AS also uses the TGS’s 
secret key (KAS-TGS) to create and send the user a ticket-granting ticket (TGT). It is 
shown as (KRB_AS_REP) in figure 3.4. 
B. Ticket-Granting Service Exchange:  
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 The client decrypts the message and recovers the session key, then uses it to create an 
authenticator containing his name and a time stamp.  
 The client then sends this authenticator, along with the TGT, to the TGS, requesting 
access to the target server (KRB_TGS_REQ).  
 The TGS decrypts the TGT, and then uses the SK1 inside the TGT to decrypt the 
authenticator. It verifies information in the authenticator; the ticket and the time 
stamp. If all of these matchs then it allows the request to proceed.  
 Then the TGS creates a new session key (SK2) for the client and application server 
(AP) to use, then encrypts it using SK1 and sends it to the client.  
 The TGS also sends a new ticket containing the client’s name, a time stamp and an 
expiration time for the ticket (KRB_TGS_REP), all encrypted with the AP's secret key 
(KTGS-AP).  
C. Client/server exchange:  
 The client decrypts the message and gets the SK2. 
 Finally ready to approach the AP, the client creates a new authenticator encrypted 
with SK2.  
 The client sends the session ticket (already encrypted with the AP's secret key) and the 
encrypted authenticator. Since the authenticator contains plain text encrypted with 
SK2, this proves how the client knows the key (KRB_AP_REQ).  
 The AP decrypts and checks the ticket, the authenticator and the time stamp.  
 For applications that require two-way authentication, the AP returns a message 
consisting of the time stamp plus 1, encrypted with SK2. This proves to the client that 
the server actually knew its own secret key and thus could decrypt the ticket and the 
authenticator.  
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D. Secure communications: 
 The target server knows that the client is actually who he claims to be, and the two 
now share an encryption key for secure communications. Because only the client and 
AP share this key, they can assume that a recent message encrypted in that key 
originated from the other party. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Kerberos authentication messages.  
Figure 3.5 shows the contents of Kerberos messages. We refer to AS and TGS as Key 
Distribution Center (KDC).  Message 1 is sent from client A to KDC (given the symbol 
S) requesting a ticket to use a service from AP (given the symbol B).  Then, S sends A 
the following message: 
Message 2:   
Message 2 includes the ticket ({Ns, Kab, A}kbs). The difference between this message 
and message2 in Needham Schroeder protocol is adding Ns. This will assist B to verify 
the freshness of message3. The purpose of Ns is to overcome the weakness of Needham 
Schroeder protocol. Detailed analysis of Kerberos is available in [8, 57, 84, 121].  
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Figure 3.5 Kerberos protocol 
The analysis below is a comparison of Kerberos protocol with Needham Schroder 
protocol: 
Message 1 sent as a plain text. It does not need to have either nonce or encryption key; 
it is out of the attacker target range because it does not have the key.  The other 
messages includes the key, therefore, it has to be secured. The analysis of message 2 in 
Kerberos is exactly as it was in message 2 of Needham Schroder; both messages have 
been encrypted by a shared key and each of them have a nonce. It will not be repeated 
again. It has to be said that the difference is in the ticket included in both messages; 
Ticket in Needham Schroder protocol does not have a nonce 
bsKab
AK , , where the 
ticket in Kerberos includes the nonce 
bsKabs
AKN ,, . Next is the analysing of message 
3: 
Message 3:  
As mentioned before, message 3 has the ticket (
bsKabs
KAN },,{ ) and the authenticator 
(
abKa
AN },{ ).  
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Since B believes Kbs as a key known only by B and S, and B sees the ticket encrypted by 
Kbs, then B concludes that S, is the right ticket. In addition, since the clocks are 
synchronized, it can be assumed that B believes that the ticket is fresh or recently sent.  
Since B trust what S believes, B would trust Kab which is in the message, and then B 
would decrypt the authenticator using key Kab. Finally, both participants A and B can 
start their secure conversation through message 4. 
A number of weaknesses have been found in Kerberos’s messages by Bellovin et al [4]. 
This shows that Kerberos needs further investigation. In the next section, the limitations 
and weaknesses of Kerberos are presented. 
3.4 Problem Definition (Attack on Kerberos) 
Although Kerberos protocol is a sufficient mechanism, the possibilities of attacks still 
exist. Davis and Swick [21] illustrated some of Kerberos’s deficiencies. [21] explored 
the vulnerability of the Kerberos protocol from the replay attacks. In this section, a 
replay attack problem is demonstrated and how it could affect Kerberos protocol.  
A replay attack is a form of network attack in which a valid data transmission is 
maliciously or fraudulently repeated or delayed. Kerberos has many mechanisms that 
aims to make replay attacks difficult. These are listed as follows: 
1. The first mechanism is that authenticators rely on machines’ clocks being 
roughly synchronized. In more details, the message must include a time stamp in 
order to prove that it is fresh or has been recently used. Given the following 
reasons, it is reasonable to challenge these points: 
a. In some cases, time varies depending on different factors such as, the 
type of service, size of the network and the amount of demand for the 
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service. These factors make it difficult to accurately define. Therefore, a 
synchronization protocols may be unauthenticated [85, 103].  
b. In addition, when a server is misled about the correct time, attackers can 
easily replay the authenticator.  
c. Moreover, the attacker might be able to mount the attack within the 
configured time.  
d. Furthermore, if the time is configured to be too short, the client will face 
problems in time synchronization.  
2. Using a cache memory to store used authenticators is another mechanism to 
guard against re-use. This cache should ok all authenticators used within the 
allowable time skew. If the server uses a cache for the used authenticators, a 
passive attack becomes impossible. A server will reject all authenticators it has 
already seen [101]. Authenticator caching makes replay attacks slightly more 
difficult, but it is not a sufficient protective mechanism. This is because of the 
following reasons: 
a.  Keys have to be saved in particular storage area. Kerberos modification 
was made to store keys in the memory. However, this area could be 
attacked.  
b. On the other hand, performing cache mechanisms is not considered a 
suitable for some other systems. For example, it is very difficult for 
TCP-based servers to store authenticators in UNIX system [102].  
c. Moreover, it is easy to store the authenticator in UDP-based servers. 
However, the problem lies when a client re-transmit a request in the case 
that the server's response was lost [88].  
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3. The third Kerberos mechanism to stop replay attack is that, the ticket inside 
KRB_AP_REQ should include the network address of the client. It should verify 
that the source address of the message matches the address in the ticket. Again, 
there is a problem in this mechanism; it is noted that the network address is 
under full control of the attacker [69]. 
During this research, other possible reasons that may cause replay attacks are 
considered; these are as follows: 
1. The administrators, in some cases, do not follow the required instructions to 
implement Kerberos in a designated manner. This is because of: 
a. Sense of irresponsibility, and lack of knowledge of the consequences of 
events that may occur because of the weaknesses in the definition of the 
system. 
b. Some users consider themselves beyond the range of the hackers.  
2. The effectiveness of Kerberos relies on the server configurations and 
implementations. In other words, it relies on the performance of the user. In a 
situation where the user used a weak password, the system is likely going to be 
easily attacked [4]. 
3. The relatively large size of the verifications that are used in Kerberos protocol 
should be noted. The proliferation of these definitions and complexity increase 
the likelihood of errors [4]. 
Many protocols in Microsoft Windows domain use Kerberos v5 as the primary 
authentication mechanism. SMB (Server Message Block) and LDAPv3 (Lightweight 
Directory Access Protocol) are examples of such protocols. SMB and LDAPv3 
protocols may be attacked by replay attack, password attack against TGT or pre-
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authentication data, and attack against message delivery time. Through a replay attack, 
the attacker will be able to access the shared files and modify directory entries with the 
victim’s credentials. A Replay Attack on Kerberos v5 exploits the final message, 
KRB_AP_REQ. If an attacker is able to access the network traffic from the victim, he 
will be able to extract the KRB_AP_REQ sent by the victim, and then simply attempts to 
re-use this message to authenticate himself to a server. In some cases, the server will 
accept the replayed message sent by the attacker allowing him full access to the service 
with the victim’s profile [60]. 
There is no suggestion that Kerberos is ineffective. But, it needs to follow up the 
performance of the users. One of the aims of this thesis is to protect the user, even in the 
likely event of failing to implement Kerberos protocol. To achieve this, a new form of 
Kerberos is proposed that will be called N-Kerberos. It works by adding client’s 
physical position address. This Address can be determined by a Global-Position-System 
(GPS) receiver. Table 3.1 shows a summary of the Susceptibilities that may cause 
exposure Kerberos protocol to the problem of replay attack. 
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Table 3.1 Kerberos protocol against replay attacks 
Techniques to prevent 
a replay attacks 
Problems possibilities 
Time stamp 
1. Difficult to accurately define due to the instability of the 
required time for the implementation of the various 
services. 
2. Server may be misled about the correct time. 
3. Attacks can be carried out within the configured time. 
4. In case of short time, legitimate client will face problems. 
Cache memory 
1. Cache memory could be attacked. 
2. It is not suitable for other systems. 
Network address 1. Network address is under full control of the attacker 
Pre definitions 
1. Administrators do not follow the required instructions. 
2. The definitions are proliferation and complexity. 
 
3.5 New Form of Kerberos (N-Kerberos) 
Although Kerberos is one of the most secure protection key exchange mechanisms, it is 
considered not robust enough. The main concern is to eliminate the possibility of replay 
attacks. We propose a modification on Kerberos that will be called N-Kerberos. It 
works by adding client’s physical position address. This Address can be determined by 
a Global-Position-System (GPS) receiver, as described in chapter 2. The great 
development that has been achieved on the GPS over the past few years gave an 
indication of a potential for integration with different techniques to raise the level of 
data protection. It is proposed that Kerberos should include the physical address of the 
user in all messages given out, in addition to the previous two conditions; encrypting the 
messages using a strong password and having a time stamp. This thesis also requires the 
server to have a database of a list of legitimate and authorised users' positions addresses. 
Having these addresses will enable the server to test out the availability of a user's 
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position address before allowing the users to utilize the services. These variables have 
been studies in three different phases: 
Phase1: in this phase, the task of confirming the authenticity of the location falls within 
the responsibility of the server.  Figure 3.6 shows the messages of phase1 of N-Kerberos 
protocol.  
In the first message, user A sends a request from server S to obtain the key, which can 
be used to communicate with the user B. Then, the server sends his response to the user 
A. This response contains a special ticket ( 
bsKabas
AKGPSN ,,, ) to be sent by A to B 
through message 3. Note that it will be preceded by the implementation of several 
Kerberos tasks. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Phase 1 of N-Kerberos 
New tasks were added for the use of the GPS, which are as follows: 
1. The server uses the list of legitimate users' physical location addresses to add A's 
physical address to the ticket ( 
bsKabas
AKGPSN ,,, ) 
2. The physical location address of B must be added to the message 
( abbs KBGPSN ,, , ). 
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Message 3 has both a ticket and authenticator. The ticket ( 
bsKabas
AKGPSN ,,, ) is 
encrypted by Kbs and the session key Kab encrypts the authenticator ( 
abKaa
NGPSA ,, ). 
The following are modifications to the previous Kerberos protocol:  
1. A adds his physical location address derived from the GPS receiver to a part of 
the authenticator. 
2.  B will not believe the message unless the GPSb located in part of the ticket, sent 
by server, matches the GPSb located in part of the authenticator, sent by A. 
In order for A to believe B, both the second message and the fourth message will be 
used to validate B's physical location. To accomplish this, the second message will serve 
as the ticket, and the fourth message will serve as the authenticator. The GPSb located in 
the fourth message, derived from the GPS receiver of B, must match the GPSb located in 
the second message, sent by the server. 
This method is preferred to compel the users to use their pre-defined physical location 
addresses, stored in the server, in order to acquire the private key which can be used to 
communicate with each other. 
Unfortunately, a problem was identified during the examination of this phase. The 
problem is in the second message; it does not contain the physical address of user A, 
where there is no evidence that the recipient of the message 2 is the user A. 
Consequently, the hacker can compromise both the second and fourth messages and 
perform the required comparison of the (GPSb) in message 2 with the (GPSb)in message 
4 without having to confirm his physical location. This means that the addition of the 
GPS feature in the second message did not add to the security of the message.  To 
overcome this, phase 2 is proposed and are as follows. 
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Phase 2: In this phase, the responsibility of confirming the authenticity of the location 
falls to the user instead of the server, as it was in phase 1.  Figure 3.7 shows phase 2 of 
N-Kerberos protocol. The method used in this phase is significantly different from the 
previous model. These differences are shown as follows: 
1. The second message contains the physical address of user A (GPSa) instead of 
the physical address of the user B (GPSb). User A has to prove to server that he is 
using the legitimate position. This can be achieved by comparing the physical 
address in the message, sent by the server ( abas KBGPSN ,, , ), with that acquired 
from the GPS receiver, which is installed in A’s location. Thus, A will not be 
able to obtain the key Kab in the absence of matching addresses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Phase 2 of N-Kerberos 
2. The ticket included in the second message ( 
bsKabbs
AKGPSN ,,, ), sent from the 
server, contains the physical address of user B (GPSb) instead of the physical 
address of user A (GPSa). B has to prove that he is using his legitimate position. 
This can be achieved by comparing the physical address in the ticket, sent by 
server ( 
bsKabbs
AKGPSN ,,, ), with that received from his own GPS receiver 
which is installed in his location. Again, B will not be able to get the key Kab in 
the absence of matching addresses. 
  
   
 
ab
abbs
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Ka
KaKabbs
KKabbsabas
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NAAKGPSNBA
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3. There is no need to add the GPSa in both the authenticator and message parts of 
message 3, and no need to include GPSb in message four, as in this phase, there 
is no longer a need to compare the GPSa's in message three, and the GPSb's in 
messages 2 and 4. 
Subsequently, the key can be used from any other place. Clearly, this causes a 
limitation, however this modification provides more protection against replay attacks. 
Unfortunately, another problem was found in this phase; there is nothing compelling the 
user to make a comparison between the two physical addresses. In other words, there is 
nothing preventing a hacker from stopping the comparison process, or to make it appear 
as if the comparison result is positive. As a result, Phase 3 was introduced to require 
users to make the comparison. 
Phase 3: Note that the P(Y) code needs special hardware, available only to the U.S. 
government, to be decrypted, and it is designed to resist electronic attacks. Users can 
capture their P(Y) code and store it to verify their physical address signature to the 
server. Figure 3.8 show phase 3 of N-Kerberos protocol. 
The signature P(Y) code has been used to encrypt the key Kab. This will enforce the user 
to decrypt the signature using his P(Y). User B has to do the same to read the key from 
the ticket when received through message 3. The modifications to phase 3 are as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Phase 3 of N-Kerberos 
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1. The server needs to capture the P(Y) of all users. 
2. The server needs to encrypt the Key (Kab) using the value of the P(Y) code of A.  
3. User A needs to decrypt the message by the key Kas, and decrypt the key kab 
using the value of his P(Y) code.  
4. The ticket, which is sent through message 3 has B’s signature. B needs to 
decrypt the ticket using Kbs , and then to uses the value of his P(Y) code to 
decrypt the Kab.  
Using this technique, the users are required to use their physical location addresses 
signature in order to read the key. The attacker will be constrained to use a maximum 
amount of time trying to decrypt Siga, which will cause problem with time 
synchronization. Therefore, N-Kerberos will eliminate the possibility of the replay 
attacks. 
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3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, the method of using the key exchange protocols was presented. The aim 
of these protocols is providing a secure channel for key exchange between different 
parties. The well known key exchange protocols such as Needham Schroder and 
Kerberos protocols were selected. Needham Schroeder protocol has been used for a 
long time until a bug was found. Kerberos protocol was produced following on 
Needham Schroeder protocol. Kerberos protocol was also shown to overcome the 
problem of Needham Schroeder protocol. However, it was shown that there is a 
possibility to attack Kerberos. It is considered that Kerberos protocol needs more 
investigations and research to decrease the possibility of replay attack against it. For this 
reason, several phases were analysed. As a result, a new form of Kerberos protocol that 
is called N-Kerberos is derived. Every single physical location has a secret and well 
encrypted signature called P(Y) code that can be captured using the receiver of the 
Global Position System (GPS).  This signature is used as a new factor, in determining 
enhanced authentication level of the user’s identity. This new technique will 
significantly reduce the ability of the hackers, the likelihood of replay attacks. To verify 
this technique, in the next chapter, a new verification tool is presented in order to 
analyse N-Kerberos protocol.  
Chapter 4:  BAN  Logic  and  its  Modification 
83 
 
Chapter 4: 
1 BAN Logic and its Modification 
 
4.1 Introduction 
There are many security protocols available and users may not necessarily be aware of 
the efficiency of their security protocol. For this reason, there may be evidence of 
vulnerability of a hack without any evident reason. For example, Needham Protocol had 
been reliable and effective over a long period without alerting its deficiencies. 
Therefore, it is essential to evaluate security protocols before adopting it. This may give 
users more confidence to use these protocols. Burrows, Abadi and Needham produced a 
formal logic called BAN logic in 1989 to evaluate security protocols [10], which offers 
a formal testing structure for security protocol. Upon being subjected to BAN logic, 
many flaws have been found in different protocols such as Needham-Schroeder and 
CCITT X.509 [34]. Many recent protocols have been subjected to BAN [12, 29, 140].  
In this chapter, a clear content of BAN logic is going to be given and also Needham 
protocol subjected to BAN logic. In addition, the need for modification of BAN will be 
Chapter 4:  BAN  Logic  and  its  Modification 
84 
 
proposed and there after a new form of BAN logic will be introduced. Furthermore N-
Kerberos introduced previously will be subjected to the modified and enhanced BAN 
logic.  
The reminder of this chapter is set out as follows: Description of BAN logic has been 
shown in section 4.2. Both Needham Schroeder and Kerberos will be subjected to BAN 
logic in section 4.3. The main outcome of this chapter is producing N-BAN logic which 
is followed on from BAN logic, will be described in section 4.4. N-Kerberos protocol is 
tested by N-BAN logic in section 4.5. Summary of the chapter is produced in the last 
section. 
 
4.2 Description of BAN Logic 
Analysing a protocol is a hard mental process as shown during the analyzing of Wide 
Mouth protocol in section 3.2. Therefore, developing a mechanism to analyse a protocol 
is valuable. Thus, a formal logic model called BAN Logic was developed by M. 
Burrows, M. Abadi and R. Needham[32]. BAN Logic helps the user to verify what is 
reasonable to be believed. It is a group of rules used to analyse data exchange protocol. 
It provides a formal method to determine whether transfer or exchange of information is 
safe and secure against any eavesdropper. BAN consists of three main steps to analyse 
any protocol [6] as described below: 
1. The first step is to explore the initial assumptions from the protocol statements, 
and translate them to symbolic notations. For this purpose, BAN uses different 
logical constructs. Figure 4.1 shows some of these constructs.  
Chapter 4:  BAN  Logic  and  its  Modification 
85 
 
2. The second step is to verify the goal. That is, verifying a secured 
communication channel between participants.  
3. The third step is a group of rules and postulates that are performed to acquire 
the goal.  
Assumptions derived from messages of protocol are subjected to BAN rules to obtain 
new assumptions until the goals are achieved. For example, if A believes that only A 
itself and B know key K, and participant A receives a message encrypted by key K, A 
may assume that the message is originated from participant B. Here a new result can be 
further used as a new assumption is achieved from previous assumptions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: BAN logical constructs 
Constructs are used to build series of logical postulates that consist of two parts; the 
numerator part is the condition and the denominator part is the result. BAN logic has 
many rules used to analyse the protocol's messages. There are four main postulates and 
are illustrated bellow: 
 
Postulate 1: 
 
 
  Kkey  by the encrypted is X Message:
B andA between key  shared a isK :
fresh is X:      #
A)on authority  has (SA over on jurisdicti has S:
X. message asent A  , X said  onceA :~
X. message a received hasA :
 true)is S if asact may  (i.e. S  believesA :
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This is called message-meaning rule. It means that if A treats K as a shared key which 
is only known by A and B, and A receives X encrypted by this key, then A would be 
certain that this message has been sent by B. 
  
Postulate 2: 
 
This is known as Part of the message rule. This formula proves that if A believes that 
any part of the message was recently sent then A would believe that all parts of the 
message are recently sent. It avoids being confused by replays; if an intruder in the 
middle attempt to intercept the message and replay it again, the life time of the message 
will be longer than what it is suppose to be, then the receiver will decline this message.  
 
Postulate 3: 
 
This is called nonce-verification rule. This verification postulate proves that A believes 
what B believes; if A believes that X was recently sent and believes that B is the sender 
of X, then A would believe that B believes X. The numerator part is the result of 
postulate one and postulate 2. 
 
Postulate 4: 
 
This postulate is called jurisdiction rule. It means that if A believes that B believes the 
message (X,Y), and A also believes that B has a jurisdiction over any part of the message 
X, then A is willing to believe X. In this rule, the first part of the numerator is the result 
of postulate 3. We can see that the postulates are a continuum series; postulate 3 
 
 YXA
XA
,#
#
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depends on postulates 1 and 2 and postulate 4 rely on postulate 3. In other word, the 
analyser has to subject the message into postulate 1 and 2 before subjecting it into 
postulate 3, and so on postulate 3 before postulate 4.  
BAN has many steps to go through in order to achieve that A believes B. These are 
called steps upgrades and shown bellow: 
Upgrade 1: it is to upgrade from A sees X to A believes that B said X. Postulate1 
mentioned above would perform this [10]. 
Upgrade 2: it is from A believes that B said X to A believes that B believes X. To reach 
this, we need to concatenate postulate2 with performing upgrade1 which 
called postulate3 mentioned above [10].  
Upgrade 3: this upgrade is the final step; it is to upgrade from A believes that B 
believes X to A believe X. This means that A and B has a secure channel to 
communicate. To achieve this, postulate 4 mentioned above has to be 
performed.   
As a case study, Wide Mouth Frog protocol is analysed by BAN logic: 
The first step is exploring the initial assumptions from the protocol statements. Table 
4.1 shows the derived assumptions and how it came up.  
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Table 4.1: Derived assumption from Wide Mouth protocol 
Assumption Meaning 
Assumptions derived from message 1 
 aNS #  
The live time of the message has been modified in 
the server before starting the communication. 
SAS as
K
  The key has been created and modified for A and S 
before starting their communication and only known 
by A and S. Therefore, both of them believe Kas 
SAA as
K
  
abKSA   A knows that key abK  is in the keys list available in 
the server. Therefore, server has a control over abK .  
abKAS 
 
Assumptions derived from message 2 
 sNB #  
The live time of the message has been modified in 
all parts before starting the communication.  
SBS bs
K
  
The key has been created and modified for B and S 
before starting their communication and only known 
by B and S. therefore, both of them believe bsK  SBB bs
K
  
abKSB   
B knows that key Kab is in the keys list available in 
the server. Therefore, server has a control over abK .  
The second step is verifying the goal, which is what B needs to be sure that the received 
message is originating from A and vice versa. The last step is subjecting the 
assumptions into BAN logic rules and these are as follows: 
Upgrade 1: upgrade from S sees message 1 to A believes that B sent message 1. 
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Since S believes asK  as a key known only by A and S, assumption, and A sees message1 
encrypted by key asK , then S concludes that A actually said message1.   
Upgrade 2: upgrade from S believes that A said message 1 to S believes that A believes 
message 1. This will be achieved by performing postulate 2 and postulate 3. 
 
 
 
 
Since the clock is synchronized and S believes that part of the message 1 is fresh, it is 
assumed that, S believes that the message 1 is fresh or recently sent. (In particular, S 
believes that, message was not replayed by some attacker intercepted prior). 
 
 
as
asas
Kaba
KabaKaba
BKNAS
BKNSBKNAS
,,
},,{#,,,~


 
Since S believes that message 1 is fresh and S believes that A said message 1, then S 
believes that A actually believes key message 1; A is the sender of message 1.  
Upgrade 3: upgrade from S believes that A believes message 1 to S believe the key Kab 
in message 1. 
 
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as
Kaba
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          Postulate 1 …4.1
 
Postulate 2 …4.2  
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

Postulate 3 …4.3  
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 
ab
abKaba
KS
KASBKNAS
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
 ,,,
 
Since S believes that A believes message 1 and S also believes that A has a control 
over abK , then S would believes abK . In other word, because S believes that A is the 
sender of the message 1, which includes key abK  and S knows that A is the only one 
who knows this key, then S would believes the message. Then S will send the key abK  
to B by message two. The rules for analyzing message 2 are presented bellow: 
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Finally, A and B believes each other and they can start to communicate with each other. 
In the next section. The deficiencies of Needham Schroeder protocol when subjected to 
BAN logic will be identified, and see how it is solved by Kerberos protocol. 
Postulate 4 …4.4  
 
Postulate 1 …4.5 
Postulate 2 … 4.6 
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s
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Postulate 3 … 4.7  
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Postulate 3 … 4.8   
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4.3 Needham Schroeder and Kerberos subjected to BAN Logic 
The limitations of Needham Schroeder Protocol that was described in the previous 
chapter when subjected to BAN logic are presented below: 
First: Derived the assumptions from the protocol’s messages. Figure 4.2 shows 
Needham Schroeder protocol. And Table 4.2 shows the assumptions derived from 
Needham protocol.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Needham Schroeder protocol  
Table 4.2 Derived assumptions from Needham Schroeder protocol 
Assumptions derived from Needham Schroeder 
protocol 
SAS asK
 
SAA asK
 
 aNS #  
 sNA #  
abKSA   
abKSB   
SBB bs
K
 
SBS bS
K
 
 bNA #  
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Second: Analysing the protocol. We will start analyzing message 2. The goal of this 
message is that participant A needs to be sure that Kab is originated by S; the analysis is 
as follows: 
  According to postulate 1: 
   
         
 
 
  According to postulate 2: 
 
 
                                      
 
 According to postulate 3: 
 
as
bs Kkababs
AKKBNSA },{,,,
)10.4(,)9.4(
  
 
  According to postulate 4: 
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ab
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
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We conclude that message 2 is secure and so far participant A believes Kab. In message 
3, the main goal is participant B needs to trust Kab. The analysis of message 3 is as 
follows: 
 According to postulate1 
 
 
 
 According to postulate2, there is no time stamp in this message. So far, postulate 2 
cannot be performed and so on postulate 3. We conclude that B can not be sure that 
message 3 has been sent by S.  
This is how BAN logic discovers the problem of Needham Schroeder protocol. 
Kerberos protocol solved this problem by adding a nonce to the ticket in both the main 
build of message 3 and the authenticator part of the message, as discussed in the 
previous chapter. Messages 1 and 2 in Kerberos protocol will not be scrutinized due to 
its similarity to the analysing of messages 1 and 2 in Needham Schroeder protocol. Next 
is analyzing message 3 of Kerberos protocol, which contains the correction of Needham 
protocol problem.  
Message 3:  
If B concludes that the message ( 
bsKabs
KAN ,, ) is secure, B would be able to read the 
key Kab and use it in order to open the authenticator.  
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Chapter 4:  BAN  Logic  and  its  Modification 
94 
 
  According to postulate1: 
   
         
 
 
  According to postulate2: 
 
 
                                      
                                                                                                                                            
 According to postulate 3: 
 
bsKabs
KANSB ,,
)15.4(,)14.4(
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  According to postulate 4: 
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,)16.4(
 
Following the analysis, B can trust the key Kab. As demonstrated, Kerberos protocol has 
a full BAN logic guarantee [89] and is trusted by many authors [62, 83]. It is one of the 
most common key distribution protocols. Unfortunately, despite all postulates have been 
performed in Kerberos protocol and it has a full guarantee from BAN, it is still 
susceptible to attacks as explained above, section 3.4. Thus, BAN logic needs to be 
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improved in order to enhance its ability to stop the Replay Attack. In the next section, a 
modified BAN logic is proposed.  
 
4.4 New Form of BAN Logic (N-BAN) 
It has been proven that BAN is a very important and successful method to evaluate 
communication protocols [121].  Although the three upgrades mentioned in section 4.2 
are performed successfully in the Kerberos protocol, and despite Kerberos having a full 
guarantee from BAN, Kerberos is still susceptible to attacks as explained above. Thus, 
BAN logic needs to be improved in order to enhance its ability to stop possible replay 
attacks. BAN logic is considered to rely on pure logical operations that should exist in 
order to conclude that the message is secure, such as a strong key or time stamp. It is 
regardless if the users are following the required logical predefinitions in prescribed 
manner. A new form of BAN logic is proposed is called N-BAN logic, it will have a 
new rule that indicates whether a message has been sent from a legitimate position or 
not using the user’s P(Y) code. It has been noted in the previous chapter that, this new 
factor does not rely on the user’s choice; encryption codes which has been used in P(Y) 
code has a very high level of security. To implement this new rule, the effect of the 
jurisdiction rule on message 3 need to be explained. As discussed earlier, AP receives a 
ticket and authenticator from the client (KRB_AP_REQ). We also knew that the ticket is 
encrypted by the key (KTGS-AP). Since the AP knows that this key is controlled by TGS, 
the AP will believe this message and use the session key to decrypt the authenticator. 
This proposal gives another layer of protection; in addition to the decryption the ticket, 
the AP has to use his physical address signature to prove his official site in order to read 
the key. Figure 4.3 shows the modification on jurisdiction rule.   
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Figure 4.3 Jurisdiction Rule in N-BAN Logic 
A new factor to the jurisdiction rule is proposed. This factor is the user’s physical 
location; the user must use his signature (SIGb) in order to believe X, where SIGb his 
P(Y) code, which cannot be obtained unless the user is using his physical location. In 
other words, the user must be in his nominated location to capture his P(Y) code in 
order to be used to verify his location and read X. By this modification, BAN compels 
the user to use his official site in order to conclude that the message is secure. Message 
3 of Kerberos is chosen and did a comparison between BAN and N-BAN logics as 
shown in table 4.3.  
Table 4.3 Comparison between BAN and N-BAN Logics. 
The logic Rules that must be perform by B in order to read Kab 
BAN  1. B believes that S believes all the contents of the message.  
2. B believes that S has a jurisdiction control over Kab. 
N-BAN  1. B believes that S believes all the contents of the message.  
2. B believes that S has a jurisdiction control over Kab. 
3. B must verify his location using the P(Y) code of his legitimate 
location.  
 
In the next section, the proposed N-Kerberos protocol is going to be analysed using N-
BAN. 
 
XB
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bSIG
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4.5 Analysing N-Kerberos Protocol Using N-BAN 
As mentioned in section 4.2, there are three main steps to analyze any security protocol. 
Figure 4.4 shows N-Kerberos protocol and Table 4.4 shows the first step of the analysis. 
It is deriving the assumptions from the protocol's messages and translating them to a 
form of logic of belief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 N-Kerberos Protocol 
Table 4.4 Extracted assumptions from Kerberos 
Extracted Assumptions and expressed by logic of believe 
SAS asK
 
 aNS #  
 sNA #  
aSigAS   
bSigSA   
abKSA   
 sNB #  
bSigBS   
aSigSB   
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abKSB   
SBB bs
K
 
SBS bS
K
 
 aNB #  
 bNA #  
The second step is drawing the goal, which the server needs to verify that the key Kab 
has been received by A and B. in other words, A and B need to trust that the 
communication channel between them is secure. Finally, the third step is performing the 
N-BAN rules. 
N-BAN requires three main key conditions as opposed to two in BAN in order to 
conclude that the message is secure. These key conditions are: 
1. The message has to be encrypted.  
2. The message should include nonce verification. 
3. The message should have the verified user's physical position.  
Details of proving the theory are as follows: 
Client A sends his request to S, and then S sends A message 2. It is confirmed that, A 
believes Kab; Since A believes Kas as a secrete key between A and S, and A received 
encrypted message 2 by Kas, then A now believes that S has sent message 2, Postulate 1. 
    
    
as
bsba
as
bsba
as
KkSigabsSigabs
KkSigabsSigabs
K
AKNBKNSA
AKNBKNA
SA
A
},,{,,,~
},,{,,,
,



 
(4.18) 
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Since the clocks are synchronized, A believes that, Ns is fresh and so, A believes that all 
the message is fresh (In particular, A believes that the message was not a replayed 
message captured sometime in the past by an attacker), postulate 2.  
    
as
bsba KkSigabsSigabs
s
AKNBKNA
NA
},,{,,,#
)(#


 
Since A believes that the entire message is fresh and S has sent the message, then A also 
believes that S believes the message, postulate 3.  
    
as
bsba KkSigabsSigabs
AKNBKNSA },,{,,,
)19.4(,)18.4(
  
The next step is to apply the jurisdiction rule. For this to be applied, A is required to 
capture his P(Y) code. If A is using his P(Y) code, he would be able to decrypt Siga and 
read the Key Kab as shown in equation 4.21. 
 
ab
aSigabab
KA
SigASKwhereKSA
a

 ,,,)20.4(
 
Message 3 has both a ticket and authenticator. The ticket is encrypted by Kab, and the 
session key encrypts the authenticator. As B is required to believe the session key (Kab) 
to access the authenticator, it first needs to believe the ticket. This is how it is proven:  
  
  
bs
b
bs
b
bs
kSigabs
kSigabs
K
AKNSB
AKNBSBB
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(4.19) 
(4.20) 
(4.21) 
(4.22) 
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  
According to the new jurisdiction rule, if: 
 B believes that S sent the ticket (equation 4.22) 
 B believes that S has jurisdiction control over the session key (kab), where kab has 
been encrypted using Siga.      
 S believes that B has jurisdiction control over Siga. 
Then B believes the session key. Therefore B starts to communicate with A securely. 
Equation 4.25 shows the jurisdiction rule.  
 
ab
bSigab
KB
SigBSKSB
b

 ,,)24.4(
 
Finally, since client A and B believe that the Key Kab is sent by the server, and the server 
believes that A and B are the only clients that can receives the key Kab, then A and B will 
start their communication confidently without possibly been compromised in any way 
by a third party.  
   
 
(4.23) 
 (4.24) 
(4.25) 
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4.6 Summary 
In this chapter, logic of believes was described and how it would be used to validate 
protocols. Details of a tool called BAN logic used to verify the protocol were also 
given. It used logic of believes to do such verification. Needham Schroeder and 
Kerberos were equally subjected to BAN logic. As a result of the scrutiny, Kerberos 
protocol has a full guarantee of BAN, although it is still vulnerable to attack, as shown 
in last chapter. More investigations were undertaken and concluded that BAN logic is 
not responsive to the complacency of the user, and therefore new condition were added 
which can be used to check the communication channel whether it is secure or not even 
where users do not implement the required verification. This new form of BAN logic is 
called N-BAN logic. This is clearly a major contribution in respect of verification. 
Finally, the proposed N-Kerberos was also analysed using the N-BAN logic with the 
desired outcome of preventing replay attack compared to BAN logic.  
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Chapter 5: 
Testing and Applications 
 
5.1  Introduction 
Rigorous testing of new application or product prior to its launch or going live is an 
important element in order to address likely teething problems that may be encountered 
by the end user and to ensure its validity and strength. In this chapter, details of the 
effect of using military signal (P(Y) code) in the authentication field are classified. Non 
incorporation of using GPS in order to verify the users’ identity is described. This 
chapter also describes the likely beneficiaries and where this technique can be 
implemented. Businesses and establishments can benefit from the technology; these are 
organizations that accept the work only through fixed locations, such as embassies or 
other public sector institutions. In addition, this technique can be used to overcome one 
of the most undesirable attack problems called pharming attack. This chapter is set out 
as follows: 
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Section 5.2 describes different cases of testing and the using of P(Y) code in the 
authentication. Where this technique can be applied is described in section 5.3. 
Conclusion and summary are given in the last section.  
5.2  Testing and Verification 
In this section, two tests will be presented; the first one is to describe the different 
between Kerberos and N-Kerberos. It is to show the effect of using P(Y) code in case of 
poor performance of the user, while the second test is to check the possibility to 
penetrate the system from unofficial site.  
In order to implement the tests, website has been designed contains two fields; password 
and location signature and submit push bottom to submit the information to the server 
as shown in Figure 5.1.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 user’s identification information form 
GPS receiver has been used to receive the user’s position coordinate number and then 
fill it manually in to the location signature field. Follow is the details of the two tests: 
Test 1: the aim of this test is to demonistrate the benefit of using the GPS P(Y) 
code in authenticate the user identity. This test will show that P(Y) code 
can be used to protect the user despite the poor performance of the user 
in the definition of system, such as selection of a weak password or not 
 
Insert the password: 
 
Location Signature: 
 
 
 
Submit 
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specifying in advance the use of a specific time in the message. The steps 
to explain this test are as follows: 
Step 1: Some pre-actions had to be performed before starting the test, which are 
illustrated in the following list:  
1. To prepare a GPS receiver and install it at the site of user A.  
2. To capture the P(Y) code of user A. 
3. To hash A’s P(Y) code and save it in the server’s database.  
4. To prepare a tool to steal and decrypt the packet.  
5. It is assumed a weakness in the setting of prior verification to the 
use the model such as, using a weak password to encrypt the 
packet and the allowed period time for sending the message is 
unlimited. Therefore, the message does not have a specific expiry 
time.  
Step 2: Testing was performed and described using the following cases:  
Case1: Using Kerberos protocol 
In this case, the following steps were undertaken:  
1. An encrypted packet was sent using Key Distributing Centre 
(KDC) of the PC to A’s PC using a weak password and unlimited 
time for using this message.  
2. Small software has been implemented to decrypt the signal. 
3. Decrypt the message using the implemented software.  
Since there is an open time to decrypt the key and the password is weak, 
several attempt were made with all possibilities until the key is realised. 
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Therefore, following the testing, the code were compromised and read 
the session key.  
Case2: Using N-Kerberos protocol 
As in case 1, the same scenario was used. In case of using N-Kerberos, it 
is essential for hackers to penetrate different levels of protection. The 
first level is to breakthrough the encryption mechanism as described in 
the first case. The second level is to penetrate the GPS (P(Y) code) 
protection. This case has the following steps: 
1. All the steps performed in case 1 were repeated. Despite this, it 
was not able to read the session key. To do so, the second level of 
protection (GPS) must be breached. 
2. Many ready made decryption softwares were used in order to 
read the session key, but fortunately, that was not possible. 
As a conclusion of this test, due to the Anti Spoof (AS) used in P-code, it is believed 
that the P(Y) code can be used to make the replay attack more difficult, even in the case 
of bad verification of the protocol. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 are to show case 1 and case 2 
respectively using message 2 of Kerberos protocol.  
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Figures 5.2 Flaw chart of Kerberos case 1 
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Figures 5.3 Flaw chart of N-Kerberos case 2 
KDC sends message 2 to user A 
A Verifies many 
factors required 
in Kerberos 
protocol. 
 
YES NO Error Message 
If during the 
allowable 
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YES NO Error Message 
If the used 
key is 
matched 
 
YES NO Error Message 
A captures his P(Y) code 
Decrypt the session key using A’s P(Y) code 
If the P(Y) 
code is 
matched 
 
YES NO Error Message 
A can read the session key 
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Test 2: The aim of this test is to check the possibility to penetrate the system from 
unofficial site; the site which is not defined in advance in the server. Two 
different places have been chosen to implement this test. The steps that should 
be performed to do this test are as follows: 
Step 1: the pre-actions that have to be performed before starting the test are 
described as follows:  
1. To prepare a GPS receiver and install it in the official site (A).  
2. To prepare a GPS receiver and install in unofficial site (B).  
3. To capture the P(Y) code of user A. 
4. To create a database of all P(Y) codes and save A’s P(Y) code on 
it. 
Step 2: There are two cases in step 2, presented as follows: 
   Case 1: Access the system from the official site. 
In this case, we capture the P(Y) code using the official site, and 
get access to the system. 
  Case 2: Access the system from unofficial site. 
In this case, unofficial site has been used. Following testing, we 
did not get to the system because the captured P(Y) code from the 
unofficial site does not exist in the server data base. 
As a conclusion of this test, the user should be in his official site in order to get access 
to the services. In the next section, different areas that can use the P(Y) code to 
authenticate the user identity are suggested. 
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5.3  Possibilities of where can it be applied? 
Following intensive investigations, it is concluded that this technology would diminish 
the challenges and menace exposed by the scenario replicated. To illustrate this, the 
different areas that can be applied to this study and the benefits that could accrue from it 
are described.  
5.3.1 Embassies 
The GPS has more possibility to use in the non-variable workplace such as embassy 
buildings or similar security sensitive buildings. It is known that the embassies do not 
allow staff to transfer files to work outside the perimeter of the embassy. In such 
system, it is suggested creating a security network based on the GPS signal in order to 
authenticate the user identity. This may increase the level of data transfer protection. 
For example, Jordanian embassies in two different places have been chosen to ascertain 
the possibility of how the system using GPS signal works. Note that next example is not 
a real implementation, it is just a possibility. The pre-required steps to implement the 
system in Jordanian embassies are presented below:  
1. Install GPS receiver in the two embassies sites (X, Y). 
2. Install GPS receiver in the key Ministry building in Jordan (M). 
3. Capture the P(Y) code of sites X (Sigx) and Y (Sigy). 
4. Save all the captured embassies’ signatures in a database in the server located in 
the key Minister building in Jordan.   
Case1: X communicates with M 
When embassy X asked M to send data, the following procedures must be followed to 
send the required data: 
1. X sends his request to M 
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2. M  requires Sigx from the database. 
3. M  prepares (X-request). 
4. M builds two different protection layer; inner and outer levels. The inner is 
encrypting X-request using Sigx and the outer is encryption of all messages using 
the shared key.  Note that the message has been signed by time stamp. 
5. X receives the message from M. 
6. Encrypt the message by the shared key. 
7. X captures his P(Y) code (Sigx) from the GPS receiver. 
8. X Decrypts (X-request) using Sigx.  
 
 
Figures 5.4.  The content of P’s responds  
The requested data are protected using two level of protection instead of one. The inner 
level is using a very well encrypted code based on user physical location as shown in 
Figure 5.3.  
Case2: X communicates with Y  
When embassy X needs data from embassy Y, the following procedures must be adhered 
to: 
1. X sends his request from Y to M.  
2. M requires Sigx and Sigy from the database. 
3. M sends Y the request of X and Sigx encrypted by the shared key between M and 
Y. as shown in figure 5.4 
 
pxx KSig
requestXNXP }}{,{: 
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Figures 55. P sends Y  X’s request  
4. X receives the message from M. 
5. Encrypt the message by the shared key (Kpx). 
6. X captures his P(Y) code (SIGx) using his GPS receiver. 
7. X Decrypts the shared key using SIGx.  
8. X sends the ticket (
ySIGxxy
SIGKrequest },,{ ) in addition to his personal 
information encrypted by his signature (
xSIGxy
KN },{ ) to Y as shown in figure 
5.5. 
 
 
 
 
Figures 5.6. X sends Y  X’s request 
9. Y prepares the request of X (X-request), and encrypt it using X’s signature and 
the shared key as shown in figure 5.6. 
 
 
Figures 5.7. X sends Y  X’s request  
10. X receives the message from Y. 
11. Encrypt the message using the shared key Kxy , 
12. X captures his signature using his GPS receiver, and encrypts his request.  
 
pxyx KSigxxySigxy
SigKrequestKNXP }},,{,}{,{:
xy SigxySigxxy
KNSIGKrequestYX },{},,{:
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5.3.2   Pharming Attack 
In recent years, phishing appears to be one of the prominent criminal activities 
pertaining to computer security. Unscrupulous groups target gullible users and direct 
them towards bogus websites in order to defraud. Hackers have adopted this method 
based on the fact that most computers users are not astute and savvy enough to identify 
phony and fake websites. In Pharming attack, the attacker redirects the user to a fake 
website; when a user sends a domain name asking to get access web page, the domain 
name will be translated to an IP address using Domain Name System (DNS). Then, the 
web browser connects to the server and loads the page which is equivalent to this IP 
address.  In Pharming attack, the attacker targets the local host file and converts the 
URLs to different numbers and then, the users will be redirected to the dummy 
websites. Users may then deal with these fake websites as a trustworthy entity without 
knowing it. The aim of the hacker is acquiring sensitive information such as user name, 
password and credit card details. The attackers target the DNS server, which would 
mean millions of internet users will be affected [59, 120]. 
This problem has come to the attention of many researchers and computer security 
professionals because of its significant adverse effects. Several researches have been 
proposed to overcome this menace. But unfortunately, the problem still exists. “It is 
estimated that businesses lose $2 billion dollars per year when their clients are targeted 
by phishing scams. Meanwhile 3.6 millions were conned out of $3.2 billion between 
August 2006 and August 2007; figures like these are expected to rise”4. The technique 
in this thesis may used to reduce the affects of pharming attack; since the DNS server 
has a fixed place, the DNS’s physical position can be used as a key condition in order to 
                                                 
4
 http://www.brighthub.com/computing/smbsecurity/articles/64476.aspx#ixzz0n0Ptat4j 
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authenticate the user’s identity. In other words, the hacker has to get access to where the 
DNS computer exists physically in order to change the host addresses.  
5.3.3 Other Places 
This methodology can be used in the areas which use fixed location in their work 
procedures such as embassies as explained above in details. List of other areas are 
presented below: 
1. Universities.  
 The Student in the university uses password to get access to the university’s 
services such as access to their account; printer, library, financial account 
academic record where applicable and many other services. Most students do not 
take adequate precaution regarding the level of password strength because they 
are distant from the security area. Therefore, using the location signature will be 
appropriate for those people. In order to overcome the limitation problem, the 
administrator can add an option to the student’s profile which they can enable or 
disable the using of the location signature based on the importance or the 
confidentiality of the requested service, in case of using student’s account 
accessing the computer system off campus.  
2. Multiple Sites.  
 There are many companies that have several sites spread over different locations 
in various parts world. The positions of these sites are fixed. Therefore, the 
position signature can be used to protect the transmitted documents among these 
sites. For example, Banks branches needs to send and receive important 
documents and figures through online transactions.  
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3.  Safety Communication. 
 Since state and public institutions are fixed in terms of their location, this 
technology will help in the transfer of sensitive data that require secure medium 
to transfer between different State institutions.  
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5.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the effect of using the P(Y) code is tested. Two different cases have been 
implemented to show the advantage of using the military signal P(Y) code in increasing 
the authenticity strength of the user’s identity. It has been concluded that despite using a 
weak password, another layer of protection using P(Y) code can protect the system. 
Different cases that show where this technique can be implemented are described. 
Furthermore, it is concluded that pharming attack can be eliminated using the user’s 
position signature (P(Y) code) to authenticate the identity of the administrator. 
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Chapter 6: 
Conclusion, Limitations and Future Work 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis assessed the level of protection when data is transmitted between users and 
computer networks. It critically examined the identification of the user in what is 
referred to as authentication. Various methods were appraised to confirm the identity of 
the user and also constraints pertaining to data protection issues. The main aim was to 
minimise the ability of hackers to interfere with computer systems. To this end, several 
available methodologies were appraised and also reviewed considerable number of 
international report pertaining to same. Particular methods were examined and the level 
of data protection used in their algorithm. As a result of the rigorous analysis, an 
enhanced and robust algorithm is developed with superior level of security to shield the 
user identity.  
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In order to achieve more secure communication channel, N-Kerberos protocol is 
proposed. N-Kerberos uses the user’s physical address, obtain by the GPS signal, as a 
new authentication factor to verify the identity of the user. In addition, a special 
evaluation tool called N-BAN logic is proposed in order to detect whether the N-
Kerberos protocol are secured or not.   
The reminder of this chapter is set out follows; Section 6.2 is to demonstrate details of 
the main contributions. The limitations are described in section 6.3. Suggestion for 
future work is provided in section 6.4. 
 
6.2 Conclusion   
As a result of the findings of this study, a non-conventional method of technologies of 
data protection needs to be developed; improvement in the encryption code is not 
sufficient solution, since it might be cracked by more competent hacker. Therefore, this 
study proposed a situation where the user is compelled to be more vigilant; in addition 
to relying on used codes. The details of the main contributions are as follows: 
 1. Literature review about the authentication. 
The importance of clarity of the user’s identity and the challenges associated 
with it were reviewed. Numerous studies which attempted to protect the user’s 
privacy in a coherent manner were examined to determine if they provide 
adequate and acceptable level of protection. 
 2. Proposed N-Kerberos protocol.  
A new form of Kerberos that is called N-Kerberos is proposed. The user’s 
physical position address as a new authentication factor is considered in order to 
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achieve a robust protection level. To achieve this, the military GPS signal (P(Y) 
code) is picked. Then, P(Y) is used to encrypt the key before sending it online. 
N-Kerberos is characterizing for two main major points as compared with 
Kerberos protocol, as listed below: 
a. In Kerberos protocol, only one key has been used. Moreover, choice of 
this key relies on the users themselves. In other words, the message 
might easily be decrypted, as a result of choosing a weak password. 
While N-Kerberos protocol uses another level of protection, in addition 
to Kerberos’s key. The new protection level is relying on the location 
signature which is very hard to be decrypted as oppose to relying on the 
user. 
b. Kerberos protocol is not mindful of how users are implementing the 
Kerberos’s required verifications before using the system. This may 
facilitate decoding the message in the case of the use of inaccurate 
definitions. While in N-Kerberos, users are saved even in cases of using 
inaccurate definitions, because they are required to use their location 
signature which is an encrypted very strongly.  
 3. Proposed N-BAN Logic  
A special tool is used to detect whether the security protocols are secured or not, 
this tool is called BAN logic. The modified BAN logic is a group of logical 
operations and is referred to as N-BAN logic. BAN logic is not sensitive to the 
non-discipline of the users. While N-BAN focused on follow-up to the user's 
performance, a new condition to the jurisdiction rule in BAN logic is added. 
This new modification requires the user to use their position during the 
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manufacture of the key. In other words, a new condition has been added and is 
considered to be a logical operation in order to believe that the sent message is 
protected. 
4. Implementation. 
An experiment was conducted to test the strength and quality of the GPS 
receiver. It is confirmed that in practice it is possible to use the power of this 
signal in raising the level of verification the identity of the user. 
 
6.3    Limitations 
In some cases, three distinct disadvantages are identified, and these are as follows: 
1.  Costly 
In N-Kerberos protocol, the organisation needs to buy a GPS receiver for every single 
employee. This will increase the cost of implementing the strategy. 
2.  Fixed location 
User must use his official and authorised location in order to have the key. This is 
considered a limitation. For instance, where an employee travels out of his authorised 
nominated location they would be denied access.  
3.  Poor Signals. 
In the likely event of adverse weather conditions, the user may not capture good quality 
signal. One practical example is the recent explosion of volcanic ashes in Iceland that 
affected most of west and northern Europe. Moreover, It has been noted that GPS 
receiver needs to be viewed by 3 or 4 GPS satellites in order to calculate the location or 
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capture the P(Y) code. Therefore, the GPS receiver may not work in a basement or in an 
underground location, and also where the signals are obstructed. 
 
6.4    Future Work 
Inserting the P(Y) code signature into the user device is proposing in the future work. 
The device may not need to use the GPS receiver every time to be protected. GPS 
receiver may be just a time in a factory and push those signatures in the devices. Figure 
6.1 shows the how inserting the P(Y) code is going to be. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Assert the P(Y) code into the devices 
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If the P(Y) code of every single employee is engraved in their device, all the limitation 
mentioned above will be overcome as follows: 
 Cost:  
The organisation will use only one GPS receiver used in all employees’ offices to 
capture the signatures and engrave them to the employees’ devices. Therefore there 
would no to be a need to buy a GPS receiver for every single employee. The cost will be 
reduced. 
 Fixed Location 
 Users can hence travel and use their devices without needing to use the official sites in 
order to connect to the system because the address has been engraved in their devices. 
This will eliminate the limitation of using fixed locations. 
 Poor signals 
To overcome constrains of poor signal in a basement building, signature details of a 
particular spot in the desired building with a strong signal world then be engraved in the 
devices of employees in the affected area. 
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